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ABSTRACT 
It is commonly accepted that state use taxes, most notably those that 
are due on Internet purchases, are largely unenforceable against individual 
consumers. Consistent with that view, states have focused their enforcement 
efforts on forcing retailers to collect those taxes at the point of sale, and 
taxpayers have maintained nearly complete indifference toward remitting the 
tax of their own accord. This combination of factors has transformed the state 
use tax into a de facto tax on honesty—a tax with which only our most 
principled, risk-averse, or perhaps foolish even attempt to comply. The current 
structure of these taxes is further troubling because compliance is a practical 
impossibility. Unfortunately, however, academic attention to the state use tax 
has focused almost exclusively on whether and under what conditions states 
should be allowed to compel vendors to collect that tax. This Article takes a 
different approach and evaluates the current structure and enforcement of state 
use taxes from economic, moral, and psychological perspectives. That analysis 
establishes that states’ current vendor-centric approaches are problematic and 
that states must instead adopt consumer-centric approaches that focus on the 
design of the tax and on its enforcement against individual taxpayers. The 
Article concludes by addressing potential arguments against that approach and 
by outlining the precise changes that are required to salvage the validity of the 
use tax. 
 
“Don’t tax you, Don’t tax me, Tax that fellow behind the tree.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Senator Long’s quip reflects an attitude that seems all too common in 
the United States. Many appear comfortable with the notion that government 
should not tax them or their current confidant, but that it should tax someone 
else, perhaps anyone else. Shifting the tax burden onto “them” often seems to 
be the right, or politically expedient, course of action. What happens, though, 
when “they” are our most honest citizens? Like George Washington in the fable 
of the cherry tree, these people simply cannot tell a lie. 
An explicit tax on honesty, on our “Washingtons,” would be clearly 
problematic, but many taxes currently operate in that manner. The demands of 
those taxes coupled with limited tax-enforcement budgets mean that many tax 
laws are not only unenforced, but may also be nearly unenforceable. The result 
is that only the honest comply. One particular tax of this kind has recently been 
the subject of intense debate, including before Congress and the U.S. Supreme 
 
 1  William B. Mead, Congress Tackles the Income Tax, MONEY, July 1973, at 55 (quoting 
Senator Russell B. Long). 
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Court—the state use tax.2 That tax is a relatively unknown or misunderstood 
tax that applies when a consumer makes a purchase of a taxable good or 
service, but does not pay the vendor an amount of tax that is equivalent to her 
local sales tax.
3
 A common situation where that occurs is when a consumer 
makes a purchase over the Internet from a vendor that does not collect sales 
tax. Consumers are technically required to self-remit use tax in that situation, 
but few actually do.
4
 Only our most honest, or perhaps foolish, comply.
5
 
Use tax non-compliance has a significant economic consequence, with 
some estimating states’ aggregate revenue losses to be over $20 billion each 
year.
6
 To put this in perspective, that loss is roughly equivalent to the estimates 
 
 2  See Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 114th Cong. (2015); Marketplace Fairness 
Act of 2013, S. 743, 113th Cong. (2013); Transcript of Oral Argument, Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. 
Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015) (No. 13-1032), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/13-1032_3d94.pdf. 
 3  This formulation is for when use tax is due (i.e., when there is a purchase “for use in the 
state” is imprecise, but serves to illustrate when use taxes may apply). See infra Part II.B 
(discussing the different state use-tax formulations). 
 4  See Scott W. Gaylord & Andrew J. Haile, Constitutional Threats in the E-Commerce 
Jungle: First Amendment and Dormant Commerce Clause Limits on Amazon Laws and Use Tax 
Reporting Statutes, 89 N.C. L. REV. 2011, 2025 (2011) (noting that “use tax compliance has been 
extremely low historically”); Nina Manzi, Use Tax Collection on Income Tax Returns in Other 
States, HOUSE RES. DEP’T 10 (April 2015), http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/usetax.pdf 
(noting that the percentage of taxpayers who report use tax in states where that tax can be 
reported on income-tax returns is approximately 1.9%). 
 5  Construing the use tax as a tax on honesty may seem a bit dramatic, but it is not a new 
characterization. See Walter Hellerstein & Jon Sedon, State Taxation of Cloud Computing: A 
Framework for Analysis, 117 J. TAX’N 11, 23 (2012) (referring to the use tax as a tax on honesty). 
Thanks to Eric Johnson for bringing this particular characterization to my attention. 
 6  See DONALD BRUCE ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SALES TAX REVENUE LOSSES 
FROM ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (2009), http://cber.utk.edu/ecomm/ecom0409.pdf. This number is 
not without debate. See, e.g., Noah Aldonas, DOR Disputes E-Commerce Sales Tax Loss 
Estimates, 65 ST. TAX NOTES 576 (2012) [hereinafter Aldonas] (noting statements by Nebraska’s 
then Tax Commissioner that the Bruce and Fox estimates of lost use-tax revenue from e-
commerce sales was significantly overstated); Joseph Henchman, Internet Sales Tax Collections 
Falling Far Short of Experts’ Estimates, TAX FOUND. (Mar. 18, 2013), http://taxfoundation.org/ 
blog/internet-sales-tax-collections-falling-far-short-experts-estimates (noting that the $11 billion 
estimate related to e-commerce is “far off” and “probably overstated by four- or five-fold”); 
Laura Mahoney et al., States See Little Revenue from Online Sales Tax Laws, Keep Pressure on 
Congress, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.bna.com/states-little-revenue-
n17179881226/ (noting that other studies have estimated the annual losses at $3.9 billion and 
$3.55 billion per year). These critiques often rely on recent experiences in states where vendors 
have started to collect use taxes shows that scholars’ estimates are overstated. It is thus fair to 
question the exact magnitude of the uncollected use tax, but it is too early to tell whether current 
estimates are incorrect. It may be that revenue collections are less than expected because vendor-
centric approaches fail to take into account consumers’ behavioral responses to those taxes. See 
infra Part III.B (discussing the reasons why vendor-centric approaches will fail to completely 
close the use-tax gap); see also Billy Hamilton, Fox and Friends: The Rest of the Story on E-
Commerce Tax Loss Estimates, 68 ST. TAX NOTES 535 (2013) (discussing the reasons that state 
collections may not match estimates). 
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of the ten-year federal revenue losses from corporate inversions—an issue that 
has received significant attention in the last year.
7
 Given their losses, states 
have been keenly interested in taking action to ensure that use taxes are paid. 
Remarkably, however, they have directed little of their energy towards 
collecting that tax from the individual consumers who owe it. States have 
instead focused their energy on getting retailers to collect the required use taxes 
at the point of sale.
8
 One vehicle for those efforts has been federal legislation 
like the Marketplace Fairness Act, which would grant states the authority to 
reach across state lines and require remote vendors (typically Internet vendors) 
to collect and remit their taxes. That legislation would represent an expansion 
of state authority and is garnering more support from politicians on both sides 
of the aisle. 
States’ focus on vendors is sensible from an economic standpoint. 
Individual consumers’ liabilities are generally very small. For example, a 
consumer in a state with an 8% sales-tax rate who makes $2000 of Internet 
purchases would owe a maximum of $160 of use tax.
9
 That amount, while 
something, is not enough to support enforcement action, especially given the 
fact-intensive nature of the liability and the potential difficulty of sifting 
through a year’s worth of credit card and bank statements to establish that 
liability. Not surprisingly, then, use-tax enforcement and voluntary compliance 
are virtually non-existent. Only our Washingtons pay the tax. 
Most analyses of the state use tax accept this situation and evaluate 
only whether and under what conditions vendors should be required to assist 
states in their collection efforts. This Article is the first to challenge that 
“vendor-centric” approach and the general apathy regarding consumer 
compliance. Use-tax nonenforcement at the consumer level creates significant 
problems that states’ current approaches will not alleviate.10 This Article 
identifies and addresses those issues by undertaking a comprehensive review of 
the state use tax, specifically addressing the economic, moral, and 
 
 7  See DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43568, 
CORPORATE EXPATRIATION, INVERSIONS, AND MERGERS: TAX ISSUES 12 (2014), 
http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc462056/. See generally id. (for a robust discussion 
of corporate inversions). 
 8  This may lead some observers to believe that the sales tax is a tax on retailers. Although 
this might be the case with regard to the legal incidence of the tax in some states, all state sales 
taxes are designed to be borne by consumers. See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER 
HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION ¶ 12.01 (3d ed. 2000) (introducing the different types of taxes 
commonly classified as “sales taxes”). 
 9  This presumes that all of the taxpayer’s purchases are subject to the state sales tax and that 
the merchants collected none of the tax at the point of sale. As these assumptions relax, the 
consumer’s tax liability would only be reduced. 
 10  States, of course, do enforce use taxes in particular situations. See infra Part II.C. 
References to use-tax nonenforcement herein refer to the lack of meaningful efforts towards use-
tax enforcement at the consumer level, in the aggregate. It does not mean that states do not 
enforce use taxes in any way. 
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psychological impacts of the current structure and nonenforcement of that tax. 
That analysis shows that states’ current use-tax structures and vendor-centric 
approaches will fail to close the current use-tax “gap,”11 infringe upon basic 
principles of morality and the Rule of Law, and ignore the negative 
psychological effects of an unenforced tax. The Article thus establishes that 
states must adopt a “consumer-centric model” of use-tax compliance that 
focuses on consumer compliance. That approach is admittedly at odds with 
those being considered today, but must be taken to salvage the validity of the 
use tax. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II introduces the current use-tax 
landscape and the basic structure of those taxes across the country. Part III then 
evaluates the current economic, moral, and psychological shortcomings of 
states’ vendor-centric approaches. It thus builds the case for the consumer-
centric model noted above. Part IV introduces and evaluates several potential 
arguments against this approach. Part V then proposes the actions that are 
necessary to salvage the validity of the state use tax and to mitigate its impact 
on the public’s perception of the legitimacy of state revenue authorities—and 
perhaps government more broadly. The impacts of that discussion thus go far 
beyond the issue of use taxes. To the extent that state revenue authorities act in 
ways that are perceived to be immoral or illegitimate, respect and trust in 
government will wane. The situation presented by the current nonenforcement 
of use taxes thus has much broader implications than whether we can shop 
online without paying tax. Part VI concludes. 
II. THE USE-TAX SYSTEM 
A. The Emergence of the Use-Tax Gap 
States have imposed sales taxes since the 1930s.
12
 Those taxes are 
imposed on consumers who purchase taxable property or services
13
 and are 
generally collected by merchants at the point of sale. Using merchants to 
collect the tax, however, means that purchasers can avoid sales tax by 
purchasing goods from a merchant that does not collect that tax—perhaps a 
 
 11  The term “tax gap” is used widely, but has many different technical definitions. For 
purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to note that the tax gap generally is the difference between 
the amount of tax owed under the substantive law and the amount that is voluntarily paid by 
taxpayers. We can further refine this to mean only the amounts paid timely or we can include 
amounts paid after the taxing authorities pursue enforcement action. See, e.g., Nina E. Olson, 
Minding the Gap: A Ten-Step Program for Better Tax Compliance, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 7, 
8 n.3 (2009) (providing definitions for the “gross tax gap” and the “net tax gap”). Because state 
taxing authorities generally do not pursue enforcement action with respect to use taxes, the 
difference between the gross and net use-tax gaps is not significant for purposes of this Article. 
 12  See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 12.02. 
 13  Sales and use taxes apply to both goods and certain services. For purposes of simplicity, 
however, the remainder of this Article will refer only to transactions involving goods. 
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vendor in a neighboring state. Every state with a sales tax consequently also has 
a compensating use tax that is owed when a purchaser uses property in the state 
but did not pay sales tax at the point of sale.
14
 Consumers are obligated to 
voluntarily remit the required use tax directly to the state. 
Of course, states have always understood that relying on consumers to 
voluntarily remit use taxes would be less effective than simply requiring out-of-
state vendors to collect that tax on their behalf, and states thus experimented 
with statutes requiring remote vendors to do just that. Those vendors were 
understandably resistant to those obligations and challenged them as violating 
the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court ultimately responded in favor of 
remote vendors by determining that states could only exercise their taxing 
power over vendors that had a physical presence within their boundaries.
15
 The 
Court thus prohibited states from reaching vendors who did business with their 
residents only from afar. 
The Court last directly addressed this issue in 1992 in Quill Corp. v. 
North Dakota.
16
 In that case, the Court granted certiorari to review a decision 
by the North Dakota Supreme Court in which that state court held that vendors 
who merely economically exploited the state’s market could be fairly called 
upon to collect and remit its tax.
17
 The lower court reasoned that the physical-
presence rule had become an anachronism because of the changing nature of 
the interstate marketplace and the technological advances of the day.
18
 The 
Supreme Court disagreed and upheld the physical-presence rule as a Dormant 
Commerce Clause limitation on state taxing power, specifically noting that 
Congress was better equipped to deal with the issue.
19
 
Regardless of whether the Court’s reasoning was sound in 1992 or still 
holds true today,
20
 it is clear that the physical-presence rule has taken more 
 
 14  The use tax also applies in other situations, which are described more fully below. See 
infra Part II.B (providing an in-depth look at additional situations in which the use tax applies). 
 15  Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967) (“But the Court has 
never held that a State may impose the duty of use-tax collection and payment upon a seller 
whose only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or the United States 
mail.”). 
 16  504 U.S. 298 (1992). Justice Kennedy recently addressed the physical-presence rule in his 
concurring opinion in a case addressing a state use-tax reporting statute. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. 
Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015). In his opinion, Justice Kennedy called that rule “a serious, 
continuing injustice” that was “now inflicting extreme harm and unfairness on the States.” Id. at 
1134 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He invited a case to review the validity of that rule, but his 
comments were simply obiter dictum. Id. at 1135. The Court has thus not taken an official 
position on the physical-presence rule since Quill in 1992. 
 17  Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 298. 
 18  Id. at 303–04. 
 19  Id. at 318. 
 20  Academic critique of the physical-presence rule as a normative matter has been extensive. 
See Adam B. Thimmesch, The Tax Hangover: Trailing Nexus, 33 VA. TAX REV. 497, 510 n.56 
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prominence with the emergence of Internet commerce.
21
 Many online vendors 
do not have physical presences in the states where their customers are located, 
and they are thus freed from the burden of collecting taxes in those states. 
Compliance falls to consumers. 
Consumer compliance with the use tax is generally accepted as very 
low, but there is a lack of formal data on use-tax compliance across the United 
States. Fortunately, a study recently performed by the Research Department of 
the Minnesota House of Representatives does provide some significant insight. 
That study reports data obtained for the tax year 2012 from 27 states that 
collect use tax on their income-tax returns.
22
 In that year, less than 2% of 
returns reported any use tax due in 18 of those states.
23
 The participation was 
above 5% in only 2 states—Maine and Vermont.24 The average reporting rate 
in the sampled states was approximately 1.9%.
25
 Nine states in the study also 
provided taxpayers with lookup tables to estimate their tax liabilities, and the 
participation rate in those states was 2.8% versus a participation rate of 1.12% 
in states without such tables.
26
 Interestingly, however, the average amount of 
tax reported was lower in states with lookup tables.
27
 
 
(2014); see also Direct Mktg. Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. at 1127–29 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (rejecting 
the normative basis for the physical-presence rule). 
 21  Overall “e-commerce” in the United States exceeded $80 billion in the first quarter of 
2015 and represented 7% of total retail commerce in the United States. Quarterly Retail E-
Commerce Sales, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Aug. 17, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.census.gov/  
retail/mrts/www/data/pdf/ec_current.pdf. 
 22  Manzi, supra note 4, at 7. 
 23  Id. at 7 tbl.1. 
 24  Maine’s participation rate of 10.2% was significantly higher than the overall rates 
reported, but researchers noted that the state had undergone a compliance campaign in 2006 and 
had an earlier practice of assessing liabilities for taxpayers who left the use-tax line on their tax 
returns blank. Id. at 7–8. 
 25  Id. at 13. The average amount of tax reported ranged from $39 in Pennsylvania to $876 in 
Connecticut. Id. at 7 tbl.1. Connecticut is a clear outlier. The next highest average amount 
reported is $154 in California. Id. 
 26  Id. at 7. State lookup tables allow taxpayers to consult with a table published by the state 
to provide them with an estimated amount of use tax owed based upon their income levels. 
Taxpayers are not necessarily shielded from liability, however, if they rely on those tables. See 
KAN. DEP’T OF REV., KANSAS 2014 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 8 (2014), http://www.ksrevenue.org/ 
pdf/ip14.pdf (noting that “[e]stimated amounts from [the lookup table] do not supersede actual 
amount of use tax owed”); MICH. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 2014 MICHIGAN MI-1040 INDIVIDUAL 
INCOME TAX FORM AND INSTRUCTIONS 7 (2014), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/taxes/MI-
1040_book_Instructions_477624_7.pdf (“Estimating your taxes does not preclude Treasury from 
auditing your account. If additional tax is due, you may receive an assessment for the amount of 
the tax owed, plus applicable penalty and interest.”); N.J. DIV. OF TAX’N, NEW JERSEY RESIDENT 
RETURN NJ-1040 36 (2014), http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/pdf/current/1040i.pdf 
(“Using the Estimated Use Tax Chart when calculating the amount of use tax to report . . . does 
not preclude the Division of Taxation from auditing your account.”). 
 27  See Manzi, supra note 4, at 11. 
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These data show that compliance rates are indeed small. The numbers 
reported in the study represent data from states where the tax issue is directly 
presented to taxpayers on their income-tax returns. Presumably, compliance is 
even lower in states where taxpayers must take the affirmative step of seeking 
out an unfamiliar use-tax return to report and pay their tax. We could thus 
presume a participation rate of effectively zero in the remaining states. 
This low level of compliance is costly. The sales-tax revenue lost due 
to e-commerce alone is estimated to be approximately $12 billion annually.
28
 
Adding in the lost revenue from catalogue sales takes this number to nearly $20 
billion annually.
29
 States have thus hoped for a reversal of the physical-
presence rule from either the Court or Congress. 
To date, the Court has shown little interest in reviewing the physical-
presence rule,
30
 but Congress is currently considering legislation that would 
allow states to require Internet vendors of a certain size to collect and remit 
their taxes. The Senate actually passed such legislation, the Marketplace 
Fairness Act,
31
 in early 2013, but the House failed to take action on the bill.
32
 In 
2014, commentators were more optimistic that the House would revise the bill 
to appeal to more conservatives, but it took no action beyond holding a hearing 
by the House Judiciary Committee.
33
 In early 2015, a new version of the 
Marketplace Fairness Act (the “Act”) was introduced.34 That version is 
fundamentally the same as the 2013 version, but has a delayed effective date.
35
 
Neither house of Congress has passed that bill. 
 
 28  BRUCE ET AL., supra note 6, at ii. The study gave two estimates—one based on a 
“baseline” growth estimate and one based on an “optimistic” growth estimate. Id. The estimated 
losses were $11.4 billion and $12.65 billion, respectively. The magnitude of these estimated 
revenue losses is not without debate. See, e.g., Aldonas, supra note 6, at 576; Henchman, supra 
note 6; Mahoney et al., supra note 6. These critiques often rely on recent experiences in states 
where vendors have started to collect use taxes but the resulting revenue gains have been lower 
than scholars’ estimates. It is thus fair to question the exact magnitude of the uncollected use tax, 
but it is too early to tell whether current estimates are incorrect. See Hamilton, supra note 6. 
 29  BRUCE ET AL., supra note 6, at ii–iii. 
 30  But see note 16 (discussing recent comments by Justice Kennedy on this matter). 
 31  S. 743, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 684, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 32  Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Comm., House Judiciary 
Committee to Hold Hearing on the Internet Sales Tax Issue (Mar. 10, 2014), 
http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/2014/3/house-judiciary-committee-to-hold-hearing-on-the-
internet-sales-tax-issue; H.R. 684 (showing that the House version of the Marketplace Fairness 
Act was referred to committee on February 14, 2013, and has not emerged). 
 33  Id. 
 34  S. 698, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 35  Id. § 3(h). A similar bill was introduced in June of 2015: the Remote Transactions Parity 
Act of 2015 (the “RTPA”). See H.R. 2775, 114th Cong. (2015). The RTPA operates like the Act, 
but is different in how the small-seller exception operates, how audits are conducted, and how 
certain terms are defined. Billy Hamilton, Why Does Chaffetz Hate the Internet So Much?, 77 ST. 
TAX NOTES 43, 45 (2015); Stephen P. Kranz, Mark Yopp & Eric Carstens, Remote Transactions 
Parity Act Introduced in the U.S. House, INSIDE SALT (June 15, 2015), 
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A full discussion of the Act is beyond the scope of this Article, but a 
couple of key points should be discussed. First, the Act would not give states 
blanket authority to require remote vendors to collect their taxes. It would only 
give that authority to states whose laws conformed to a number of simplifying 
provisions.
36
 States that were unwilling or unable to do so would not gain any 
power. Second, the Act contains a “small seller” exception that would 
significantly limit its grant of authority.
37
 That exception protects vendors who 
make no more than $1 million in remote sales in a year.
38
 Both of those aspects 
of the Act would limit its effectiveness in closing the use-tax gap, and are 
discussed in further detail below.
39
 
B. A Deeper Look at the Use Tax 
Internet purchases currently represent the paradigmatic example of 
when use taxes are due, but they do not tell the whole story.
40
 One additional 
situation in which they apply is when a consumer physically travels across state 
lines and purchases a good at low or no tax. Take, for example, a resident of 
Massachusetts who travels to New Hampshire to purchase some item for use 
back home. That person would avoid tax at the point of sale because New 
Hampshire does not impose a sales tax and because the sale occurred in that 
 
http://www.insidesalt.com/2015/06/remote-transactions-parity-act-introduced-in-the-u-s-house/. 
Those differences are largely irrelevant for purposes of this Article, and this Article will thus 
focus its discussion on the Act rather than comparing the two. But see infra note 79 (discussing 
the impact of the difference between the two bills’ small-seller exceptions). This Article will also 
not discuss a draft bill introduced by House Judiciary Committee Chair Bob Goodlatte: The 
Online Sales Simplification Act. See Hamilton, supra, at 44. That draft relies on an origin-
sourcing concept that is heavily critiqued by those in the tax community. See John A. Swain, 
Reconciling the Marketplace Fairness Act and Origin Sourcing, 75 ST. TAX NOTES 809 (2015); 
Maria Koklanaris, NCSL Blasts Goodlatte for Hybrid Origin-Sourcing Proposal, 75 ST. TAX 
NOTES 251 (2015). 
 36  S. 698, § 2. 
 37  Id. § 2(c). 
 38  Id. 
 39  See infra Part III.B. 
 40  State enforcement of use taxes is generally limited to consumers with very high value 
purchases like airplanes, motor vehicles, or artwork. See Paul Merrion, Illinois Sales Tax 
Collectors Crack Down on Out-of-State Boat Purchasers, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Dec. 4, 2010), 
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20101204/ISSUE01/312049980/illinois-sales-tax-
collectors-crack-down-on-out-of-state-boat-purchasers (noting that Illinois was enforcing use tax 
against “owners of boats, airplanes, expensive vehicles and other big-ticket items”); Paul Walsh, 
Minnesota Says It’s After Owners of RVs Who’ve Dodged Sales Tax, STARTRIBUNE (Nov. 17, 
2011), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-272675835.html (discussing state enforcement of use 
taxes on purchases of recreational vehicles); Jenifer Warren, Art—and Tax Bills—Are in the Eye 
of Beholder, L.A. TIMES (May 14, 1995), http://articles.latimes.com/1995-05-14/news/mn-
574_1_ted-field (noting that “[i]n reality, authorities only go after big-ticket items, such as 
planes, vehicles, boats and art. The effort to track down sweater buyers would cost the state more 
than the payoff in taxes, officials say”). 
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state.
41
 Technically, however, the Massachusetts use tax would apply when the 
consumer used the item back home.
42
 
The situation just noted is similar to that presented by many Internet 
purchases because the vendor collected no tax at the point of sale. We can 
create a more complex example, however, by assuming a situation in which the 
vendor did collect some amount of local sales tax, but at a rate less than the 
purchaser’s local rate. Imagine, for example, a resident of Fort Worth, Texas, 
who travelled to the 2015 College World Series in Omaha, Nebraska, and 
purchased a souvenir Texas Christian University Horned Frogs baseball cap for 
his child at home. That person would pay sales tax on the purchase at a rate of 
7% (the local rate in Omaha).
43
 His local sales tax rate in Fort Worth, however, 
is 8.25%.
44
 Technically, then, he would owe an additional 1.25% to his home 
jurisdiction to make up this difference. For a $20 hat, that would represent an 
additional liability of $0.25. This result stems from the technical way that use 
taxes apply, which is that the use tax is always owed on the use of taxable items 
in the state. Taxpayers receive a credit, however, for any sales taxes paid on the 
purchase of the product.
45
 Under Texas law, then, the purchaser would owe tax 
at a rate of 8.25% but receive a credit for the 7% tax that he paid.
46
 As a 
consequence, he would be legally required to remit his final 1.25%, or $0.25, to 
the state. 
The applicability of the use tax in this situation raises significant 
difficulties for the administration and enforcement of the tax. Consumers may 
make a multitude of those types of purchases throughout the year with little 
record keeping. The individual liabilities may also be very small, like for our 
loyal Horned Frogs fan. A taxpayer wanting to comply with the use tax may 
thus find it nearly impossible to comply unless she keeps a use-tax journal on 
her at all times. 
As implausible as compliance sounds under the facts just discussed, 
consumer compliance may actually be more difficult in other situations. It is 
possible, for example, for use taxes to be owed when an individual uses her 
possessions in a new state after moving her residence across state lines. The 
application of use tax in that situation depends on the wording of the state’s 
 
 41  Frequently Asked Questions—General, N.H. DEP’T OF REVENUE ADMIN., 
http://www.revenue.nh.gov/faq/general-information.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2015) (noting that 
New Hampshire does not have a sales tax). 
 42  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 64I, §§ 2, 7(c) (2015). 
 43  Current Local Sales and Use Tax Rates, N.H. DEP’T OF REVENUE, 
http://www.revenue.nebraska.gov/question/sales.html#o (last visited Oct. 8, 2015). 
 44  Local Sales and Use Tax, TEX. COMPTROLLER OF PUB. ACCT., 
http://www.window.state.tx.us/taxinfo/local/city.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2015). 
 45  HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 16.01[2]; see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
64I, § 7(c) (providing an exemption from use tax for sales tax that “was legally due without any 
right to a refund or credit thereof”); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.303(c) (West 2015). 
 46  TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.303(c). 
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use-tax statute. Some statutes apply only when items are purchased specifically 
“for use” in the taxing state.47 A number of other states, however, have statutes 
that are not as lenient. In those states, the use tax applies both to goods that are 
purchased “for use” in the state and also to goods that simply are so used.48 In 
those states, bringing your household items with you on a move can prove 
costly—theoretically.49 Some states with that type of statute provide relief by 
reducing the tax owed based on the value of the property at the time it is moved 
into the state, rather than its original purchase price,
50
 but the tax is still 
technically owed. 
As this discussion establishes, use taxes are an issue with respect to 
Internet commerce but apply much more broadly. The tax is structured as a 
complete complement to the state sales tax and creates significant burdens as 
such. Compliance with the use tax under these situations can be incredibly 
complex, even for consumers who dutifully track their activities. The 
combination of these difficulties and consumers’ low levels of knowledge of 
the tax means that use-tax compliance is virtually nonexistent. 
C. Existing Efforts to Close the Use-Tax Gap at the State Level 
Despite the high levels of noncompliance discussed above, states 
largely fail to enforce their use taxes against individual consumers.
51
 That 
 
 47  HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 16.03[1] (“Roughly half of the states 
confine their use taxes to tangible personal property purchases for use within the state.”). Those 
types of statutes are often coupled with presumptions that apply in determining whether an item 
falls within this construct. Id. Massachusetts’s law, for example, provides a presumption that an 
item is purchased for use in the state if it is “shipped or brought into the commonwealth within 
six months after its purchase.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 64I, § 8(f). 
 48  HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 16.03[3]. 
 49  The “theoretically” qualifier is necessary because use taxes are rarely, if ever, enforced in 
this situation. 
 50  HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 16.03[3]. This may be required both as a 
matter of constitutional law and to align the tax with the consumption that is actually occurring in 
the state. Id. at n.78. A reduced value for the item means that the taxpayer has “consumed” some 
of the asset’s value before moving into the new state. That amount of consumption thus occurred 
outside of that state and it should not be taxable there. 
 51  Manzi, supra note 4, at 3–4; see Phillip W. Gillet, Jr., Privacy Issues May Add to the 
Debate over State Taxation of e-Commerce, J. MULTISTATE TAX’N, Sept. 2001, at 16 (noting that 
use-tax enforcement is “a logistical nightmare” and that “states rarely actively enforce their use 
tax provisions”). There are exceptions worthy of note. For example, use taxes are generally 
enforced against business taxpayers. This is because businesses often have sales-tax filing 
obligations with respect to their normal business activities and report use tax as a part of that 
filing process. A state audit may thus effectively capture that activity. Specifically, a business 
may owe use tax when it pulls an item out of inventory and uses it for another purpose. 
HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 16.09. A business may also owe use tax when it 
utilizes a produced good for a purpose other than sale. Id. ¶ 16.07. States also enforce use taxes 
on titled vehicles and significant asset purchases like recreational vehicles, airplanes, boats, or 
artwork. See Merrion, supra note 40; Walsh, supra note 40; Warren, supra note 40. Perhaps most 
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inaction may seem permissible or practically compelled because use taxes seem 
unenforceable. Each individual consumer owes relatively little in tax, so 
enforcing the tax through individual audits seems unadvisable from a return-on-
investment perspective. This is especially true when enforcement dollars are 
scarce. States have, however, recently taken two different notable approaches. 
First, states have begun to incorporate use-tax payments into their 
income-tax filing processes instead of using a separate use-tax return. Twenty-
seven states currently do so by including a use-tax line item on their individual 
income-tax returns.
52
 Implementation of this method has taken different forms. 
Some states provide a line-item on their return and nothing more, some provide 
tables for taxpayers to find an average amount of tax due, and some require 
taxpayers to specifically write “zero” in the use-tax line if they are reporting no 
use-tax liability.
53
 The State of Michigan has gone one step further, and 
provides a warning to taxpayers when they access the state’s income-tax return 
online.
54
 The state’s webpage displays a warning that, if the taxpayer reports 
“zero” on the use-tax line, she is “certifying that no USE TAX is owed.” The 
warning then notes that “[i]f it is determined that Use Tax is owed, the taxpayer 
will be liable for the deficiency as well as interest and may be subject to 
penalty.”55 
Despite the ragged nature of these approaches, they have been 
somewhat successful, in that they have generated some revenue.
56
 Compliance 
 
significant among these is the use tax on personal automobiles. If a vendor does not collect sales 
tax at the dealership, states generally require remittance of the use tax as a condition to 
registering the vehicle. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 47:303 (2015); ME. STAT. tit. 29-A, § 409 
(2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 482.225 (2015). Use-tax enforcement and compliance on vehicles 
should thus approach 100%. Use tax is also collected anytime that a consumer purchases an item 
from an out-of-state vendor with an in-state physical presence. Where such a purchase 
technically occurs out of state, there is no in-state sale on which the sales tax can apply. The 
vendor, however, is compelled to collect the sales or use tax by virtue of its physical presence in 
the state. Technically, the tax collected is a use tax because the only taxable event in the state is 
the customer’s use of the product therein. Most would consider this tax payment a sales tax 
nonetheless because it is collected at the point of sale. 
 52  Manzi, supra note 4, at 2. 
 53  Id. at 5–7; see supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing state lookup tables). 
 54  MICH. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 26. 
 55  The pop-up box containing these statements is initiated when the website is accessed. Id. 
This approach is obviously remarkable. 
 56  Manzi, supra note 4, at 7 tbl.1. A recent study of use-tax payments in Illinois reported that 
the number of taxpayers reporting use taxes increased from a mere 8,000 to more than 240,000 
after the state included a use-tax line item on the state’s income tax return and provided taxpayers 
with a use-tax lookup table. Of those reporting use tax, 60% reported the precise amount 
provided on the look-up tables. See JOANNA KOH, DAVID MERRIMAN & HECTOR M. VIELMA, 
FACTORS INFLUENCING USE TAX PAYMENT IN ILLINOIS 159 (2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/13rescontaxpayment.pdf (noting that states make “almost no effort to audit personal income 
tax filers’ use tax payments”). 
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rates in those states, however, are still shockingly low.
57
 The data discussed 
above show that the percentage of returns reporting use tax in states where 
there is a line item on the income-tax return ranges from 0.2% to 10.2%.
58
 
Those data are skewed by states with reporting percentages significantly above 
the average. As noted above, average compliance in states without a lookup 
table is 1.3% and is 2.2% in states with a lookup table.
59
 
The other major state effort to collect use taxes from individual 
taxpayers has been certain states’ efforts to implement information-reporting 
systems with respect to catalogue and online purchases. Those efforts started 
with Colorado in 2010. In that year, the state adopted a unique statute that 
imposes three different obligations on retailers who sell to consumers in the 
state but who do not collect and remit the state’s sales or use taxes. The first is 
a transaction-based notice that vendors are required to provide to Colorado 
purchasers during the course of their purchase transaction.
60
 That notice 
informs consumers of the existence of the state use tax and their responsibility 
for paying that tax.
61
 The law also requires vendors to send consumers an 
annual report that summarizes their annual purchase activity from that vendor.
62
 
Finally, the law requires that the vendors mail an annual summary statement to 
the Colorado Department of Revenue.
63
 That statement informs the state of 
taxpayers’ total annual purchases from the vendor.64 
A number of states have adopted similar, but less extensive, reporting 
laws in the style of the original Colorado law.
65
 Those laws are different 
because they only require a point-of-sale notification and not annual summaries 
that must be sent to consumers or to the state. Thus, although they are similar in 
that they seek to increase the salience of the use tax, they do not take complete 
advantage of the information-reporting aspects of the Colorado law. 
 
 57  Manzi, supra note 4, at 7 tbl.1. 
 58  Id. at 13 tbl.3. 
 59  Id. at 10. 
 60  COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5)(c)(I) (2015). 
 61  Id. 
 62  Id. § 39-21-112(3.5)(d)(I)(A). 
 63  COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5)(d)(II)(A). 
 64  Id. This information-reporting scheme has been the subject of constitutional challenge 
since shortly after its enactment and that litigation is currently ongoing. See Direct Mktg. Ass’n 
v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015) (holding that a challenge to the Colorado legislation in federal 
court was not barred by the Tax Injunction Act and remanding the case to the Tenth Circuit for 
further consideration). The ultimate resolution of the case may involve an affirmation or rejection 
of the ongoing validity of the physical-presence rule. 
 65  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139.450 (LexisNexis 2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1406.1 (2015); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-36-2691(E) (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-63-2 (2015); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 32, § 9783 (2015). 
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Beyond these limited activities, states have done very little to 
systematically encourage knowledge of, or compliance with, their use taxes.
66
 
States have undertaken some efforts that were limited in scope and duration, 
but those programs have failed to have long-standing effect.
67
 That lack of 
success may cause further indifference towards compliance efforts aimed at 
individuals. For reasons discussed below, however, that indifference is 
problematic. 
III. THE CASE FOR USE-TAX ENFORCEMENT 
The preceding materials introduced the current structure of state use-
tax systems, the lack of state enforcement of those taxes, and the difficulties 
that consumers would face when attempting to comply with those taxes. States’ 
responses to these problems have largely focused on getting vendors to collect 
that tax at the point of sale, which has many advantages. It centralizes the 
collection and remittance procedure so that states obtain greater benefits from 
audit activity, vendors likely have existing systems for handling those duties, 
and consumers, who are largely unaware of the technical tax rules, are 
protected from worrying about the tax. This vendor-centric approach is not 
without consequence though, and the following sections build the case for an 
approach to use-tax enforcement that focuses specifically on consumers and 
their obligations—a consumer-centric approach. 
At the outset, it is important to understand why the use tax should be 
enforced at all, and the first section that follows explains why use taxes matter 
within the context of states’ tax systems.68 The second section addresses the 
economic necessity for states to adopt consumer-centric approaches to use-tax 
compliance. The third then addresses the moral case for use-tax enforcement. 
The fourth discusses the negative psychological impacts that nonenforcement is 
likely to have on taxpayers. Finally, the fifth analyzes how a consumer-centric 
approach would specifically respond to concerns that are currently being voiced 
regarding states’ vendor-centric approaches. Together, these sections establish 
that states’ current approaches are insufficient to address the issues that 
currently exist with the state use tax and that states must instead adopt a 
consumer-centric approach to that tax. 
 
 66  The State of North Carolina has taken the discussed approaches and also unsuccessfully 
attempted to gather its residents’ purchasing information directly from Amazon.com. See 
Gaylord & Haile, supra note 4, at 2025–39 (discussing the state’s attempts to collect use tax and 
its litigation with Amazon.com over consumer information). 
 67  See Adam B. Thimmesch, Testing the Models of Tax Compliance: The Use-Tax 
Experiment, 2015 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 27–30) (on file with author) 
(discussing other state efforts to generate use-tax compliance). 
 68  This is important both for states and for consumers. States must be concerned with the role 
that use taxes play in their overall tax system. Individuals, on the other hand, may need to 
understand why use taxes matter if they are to be compelled to care about voluntary compliance. 
2015] TAXING HONESTY 161 
A. Why Enforce Use Taxes at All? 
It is safe to assert that use-tax enforcement is not something that 
concerns many taxpayers. Increased enforcement is more likely to be met with 
significant opposition than welcomed. It is thus fair to ask why use-tax 
enforcement efforts would be worth the hassle for states. The response to this is 
multifaceted. As an initial matter, the economics suggest that states have an 
immense interest in enforcing the tax. As noted above, one estimate suggests 
that the use-tax gap is approximately $20 billion annually.
69
 The lack of that 
revenue has necessarily impacted states. They must have compensated for those 
losses either by raising their sales-tax rates, by relying more heavily on other 
taxes, by limiting the services that they offer, or by going into debt. States 
could thus use that revenue to increase spending on matters of public need or to 
simply restructure their tax systems to lower the forms of tax that are currently 
above their desired levels.
70
 
Use-tax compliance also matters because the use tax plays an integral 
role in the design of a rational, neutral consumption tax. As discussed above, 
the use tax functions as a backstop to the sales tax,
71
 and their tax bases should 
therefore be the same. Any mismatch simply creates a tax distortion. 
Exempting Internet purchases from the use tax, for example, creates a system 
where the imposition of a state’s consumption tax depends on taxpayers’ 
methods of completing an exchange. If a consumer completes a purchase at a 
physical store, he will pay sales tax. If the consumer purchases the item online, 
he will not pay any tax. No normative theory of taxation supports this result. It 
is simply a subsidy to one form of commerce.
72
 
 
 69  But see supra note 6 (providing citations to sources discussing the accuracy of those 
estimates). 
 70  Some states have seen laws enacted or introduced that would apply any revenues from the 
Marketplace Fairness Act to reduce their income taxes. See infra notes 179–82. Of course, 
theoretically, a state could desire none of these things. It could support no additional spending 
and could feel as though its tax burden is distributed equitably among citizens and tax types 
based on how consumers currently allocate their consumption between vendors. For those states, 
then, use-tax enforcement may not have an economic impact. That is not to say, however, that 
there are not non-economic benefits that would be derived from use-tax enforcement in this 
unlikely scenario. 
 71  See supra Part II.A. 
 72  See infra Part IV.C (discussing whether use-tax nonenforcement is justifiable as an effort 
to promote electronic commerce). Of course, the real-world subsidy that stems from use-tax 
nonenforcement is more nuanced than introduced. In contrast to the example in the text, sales tax 
would not be collected on a purchase made in a physical store if the state in which the store is 
located does not impose a sales tax. Similarly, use tax would be collected on an Internet purchase 
if the vendor has a taxable nexus with the purchaser’s home state. The first refinement means that 
use-tax nonenforcement provides an additional distortion—one in favor of purchasing in states 
without sales taxes. The latter means that the distortion in favor of Internet commerce does not 
extend to all Internet commerce. 
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The likely distributional aspect of use-tax nonenforcement is also 
important. Consumption taxes are generally accepted as regressive in nature.
73
 
That is, they consume a larger percentage of the income of low-income 
taxpayers than they do of high-income taxpayers. The very nature of the 
transactions that lead to use tax likely shifts that burden even further onto our 
lowest-income citizens. The main types of transactions that lead to use tax 
(Internet purchases, catalogue purchases, and out-of-state purchases) are 
generally more available to those of means. Shopping online requires not only 
available credit or funded debit cards, but also requires a stable address at 
which to receive packages. These may not be available to our poorest of 
citizens. With respect to out-of-state purchases, one can only travel out of state 
to make purchases if one has reliable transportation and income available for 
such trips.
74
 Those trips also often represent pleasure trips or trips associated 
with business requirements, and those situations may not present themselves as 
frequently for our less-affluent citizens. The likely distributional impact of the 
failure to enforce use taxes thus provides further reason that action is 
warranted.
75
 
There are at least two other important reasons to enforce the use tax—
the moral imperative to do so and the negative impacts that nonenforcement 
will have on tax compliance generally. Those two issues are discussed in detail 
below with respect to why use taxes should be enforced specifically against 
consumers. A discussion of those rationales here would thus be largely 
duplicative and is omitted. Those rationales apply broadly, however, to suggest 
that use-tax enforcement is an important issue without regard to whom states 
direct the enforcement activity. 
B. The Economic Imperative for a Consumer-Centric Approach 
States prefer vendor-centric approaches to the use tax for logical 
reasons—vendors are more likely to comply with a tax-collection obligation 
than consumers are to pay the tax of their own accord, and auditing vendors is 
much easier than auditing all of their customers. Vendor-centric approaches 
therefore appear to have the best chance of actually raising revenue with little 
effort on the part of states, and it is easy to understand why state efforts to close 
the use-tax gap have recently focused on the Marketplace Fairness Act and 
similar legislation. Unfortunately for states, however, analysis of the Act shows 
that it is unlikely to provide the relief that they seek. Even if they were 
 
 73  See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 12.03. 
 74  Of course, this depends on the proximity of a taxpayer to the state’s border, but among 
similarly situated taxpayers, geographically, means still matter. 
 75  Even if a state feels that the overall distribution of its tax burden is equitable, it makes 
sense to impose that burden as transparently as possible. Obtaining an equitable level of tax 
distribution through uncontrollable consumer behavior (i.e., shopping online or in remote states) 
and enforcement mechanisms, is simply too opaque to be favored—even if it is possible. 
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somehow able to get the Act through Congress, many factors would stand in 
the way of full, or near full, use-tax collection. These include the impact of the 
small-seller exception, states that do not conform to the requirements of the 
Act, the difficulty of enforcement against international sellers, and distorted 
consumer purchasing decisions. 
Most significant among these is likely the small-seller exception 
discussed above. That exception would insulate retailers from use-tax 
collection obligations under the Act unless they generate more than $1 million 
of annual remote sales.
76
 That exemption is intended to protect smaller vendors 
from onerous reporting obligations and the potential for costly audits. 
Unfortunately for states, however, those “small” vendors do a significant 
amount of commerce. The percentage of online commerce done by such 
retailers represents just over 40% of the total annual online sales.
77
 The large 
vendors that make the remaining sales also already collect tax in many states. 
Experts thus estimate that passage of the Act with a $1 million small-seller 
exception would reduce the use-tax gap by less than 50%.
78
 On these numbers, 
even if the Act were passed, a significant amount of revenue would still go 
uncollected. Further, if congressional negotiation were to drive the small-seller 
exception upwards, the benefits of the Act would naturally go down.
79
 
Another factor reducing the effect of the Act is that it does not grant 
blanket authority to states. To take advantage of the Act, states must either 
become a member of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (the 
“SSUTA”) or their laws must be consistent with certain “simplification 
requirements” provided by the Act.80 Becoming a member of the SSUTA 
requires adherence to requirements related to the administration of sales and 
use taxes, the tax base, certain procedural requirements related to changes to 
their laws, rate harmonization requirements, adherence to defined sourcing 
rules, uniform definitions for terms, exemption procedures, rules related to 
 
 76  S. 698, 114th Cong. § 2(c) (2015). 
 77  Donald Bruce & William F. Fox, An Analysis of Internet Sales Taxation and the Small 
Seller Exemption, SBA (Nov. 2013), http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/rs416tot.pdf. 
 78  Id. at 40. 
 79  One major alternative to the Act, the Remote Transactions Parity Act (the “RTPA”), 
includes a small-seller exception that differs significantly from the one in the Act. First, the 
dollar threshold in the RTPA refers to all taxable sales made by the retailer, rather than to the 
amount of remote sales made by the retailer. Remote Transactions Parity Act of 2015, H.R. 2775, 
114th Cong. § 2(c)(1)(A)(i), (B)(i), (C)(i) (2015). Second, the exception protects retailers making 
sales of $10 million or less in the first year after its enactment, with that amount falling to $5 
million and $1 million in the second and third years after its enactment. Id. After the third year, 
no small-seller exception would apply. This construct would obviously reduce the benefits of the 
RTPA in the first two years (as compared to the Act), would be equal in the third year, but would 
provide a greater benefit in all subsequent years. Given the current discussions regarding 
congressional intervention in this area, it seems unlikely that a bill with no small-seller protection 
will be politically viable. 
 80  S. 698, § 2(a)–(b) (2015). 
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sales tax holidays, and refund procedures, among others.
81
 Currently, 24 states 
comply with the SSUTA requirements.
82
 Those states are generally less-
populated states
83
 and represent only 31% of the entire U.S. population.
84
 
The alternative way to “qualify” under the Act requires states to 
similarly simplify and harmonize the administration of their taxes, their tax 
bases, and their sourcing rules.
85
 It also requires that states provide vendors 
with certain information about their taxes and free software for calculating 
sales-tax liabilities.
86
 States must further relieve sellers and the software 
providers from certain liabilities related to sales and use-tax errors.
87
 
Regardless of which route is analyzed, states that are not currently 
SSUTA members or whose systems do not meet the required simplification 
measures could have significant work to do in order to take advantage of the 
Act. That may involve political battles with local governments that currently 
have functionally independent sales-tax systems. States that are unable or 
unwilling to modify their systems in the ways required under the Act would 
thus not obtain any additional revenue from the Act. 
The Act also fails to address the difficulties inherent in attempting to 
impose collection obligations on international merchants. Technically, the Act 
could subject any vendor worldwide to state authority,
88
 and state use taxes 
generally apply to international purchases.
89
 Enforcing the tax against 
international vendors, however, obviously involves much more difficult and 
costly questions for states. Use-tax collection on purchases made from 
 
 81  STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX AGREEMENT OF 2002 (2013), 
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/uploads/downloads/Archive/SSUTA/SSUTA_As_Amended_
10-30-13.pdf. 
 82 About Us, STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BOARD, INC., 
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=About-Us (last visited Oct. 8, 2015). 
 83 Streamlined State Status 01-01-14, STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BOARD, INC., 
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/uploads/images/state%20map%202014_1_1.jpg (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2015). 
 84  About Us, supra note 82. 
 85  S. 698, § 2(b)(2)(A)–(C) (2015). 
 86  Id. § 2(b)(2)(D). 
 87  Id. § 2(E)–(H). 
 88  Foreign sellers in many countries are protected from U.S. taxation by tax treaties that limit 
U.S. taxation to those sellers with permanent establishments in the country. See BORIS I. BITTKER 
& LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶¶ 67.1.3, 67.6.9 (3d 
ed. 2005). Notably, though, those treaties generally do not impact state authority. HELLERSTEIN & 
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 8.17[1][c] (noting that “the tax treaties into which the United States 
has entered do not generally cover the taxing activities of subnational governmental units such as 
States”). 
 89  California is a notable exception and allows an exemption for up to $800 of taxable goods 
purchased in a foreign country. See Annette Nellen, California Use Tax Exemption for Foreign 
Purchases Should Be Repealed, 72 ST. TAX NOTES 601 (2014) (discussing and advocating for the 
removal of California’s exemption). 
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international vendors would thus be more likely to continue to rely on self-
reporting by taxpayers. 
The ease with which consumers modify their behavior to the addition 
of use-tax collection on online sales would also amplify the impact of each of 
the previously discussed revenue-reducing factors. To the extent that 
consumers can shift their consumption to vendors that fall within the small-
seller exception or that are located internationally, state revenue gains from the 
Act will be reduced. Unfortunately for states, recent research shows that 
consumers do respond quickly to the collection of tax by online retailers. 
Recent research on consumers who use eBay, for example, showed that buyers 
were less likely to purchase goods from a seller that would collect sales tax on 
the transaction.
90
 Research on consumer response to the collection of sales 
taxes by Amazon.com also supports those results and shows that consumers 
quickly change their online shopping behavior by purchasing from vendors that 
do not collect tax, even those vendors who sell on Amazon’s platform.91 
In the Amazon study, researchers looked at purchases on Amazon.com 
in five states for which that retailer started collecting use taxes between 2012 
and 2013.
92
 The researchers found that consumers in those states reduced their 
shopping on Amazon during that period by 9.5% based on the value of products 
purchased.
93
 Consumers reduced their purchases most dramatically with respect 
to high-value items.
94
 The researchers also looked into whether consumers were 
substituting away from Amazon by purchasing from local brick-and-mortar 
stores or by purchasing from other online vendors. They found that consumers 
in the study did increase their purchases from local retailers, but that the sales 
of competing online retailers increased much more significantly.
95
 The 
substitution effects were more significant when looking at purchases over $300. 
For those purchases, the researchers found a 6.5% increase in purchases at local 
stores but a 23.7% increase in purchases from other online retailers.
96
 Perhaps 
most strikingly, merchants who sold their goods using the Amazon 
Marketplace saw an increase in those “large sales” by 60.5%.97 This last result 
is striking. Consumers responded to the collection of tax by Amazon, in many 
cases, not by leaving that website, but by simply purchasing from third-party 
 
 90  Liran Einav et al., Sales Taxes and Internet Commerce, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 24 (2014). 
 91  Brian Baugh et al., The “Amazon Tax”: Empirical Evidence from Amazon and Main Street 
Retailers (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20052, 2014), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20052.pdf. 
 92  Id. at 1. 
 93  Id. at 2. 
 94  Id. at 2–3. 
 95  Id. at 3. 
 96  Id. 
 97  Id. The Amazon Marketplace allows retailers to sell their products using the Amazon 
platform by paying the retailer a fee. See Getting Started with Selling on Amazon, AMAZON, 
http://services.amazon.com/content/sell-on-amazon.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2015). 
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merchants that sell on the website. The way that the Amazon Marketplace is 
operated, consumers can purchase from such a merchant without even realizing 
it.
98
 Amazon may handle the merchant’s inventory and shipping, and the 
consumer receives the item in an Amazon.com branded box.
99
 Consumers are 
thus able to avoid paying tax without any real change to their behavior, and 
they do so in large numbers. These data indicate that we would see further 
diversion of sales to smaller vendors if and when the Act were enacted.
100
 
As noted above, one collateral issue to also consider is how voluntary 
compliance might suffer because of the Act. Use taxes are fundamentally taxes 
on consumers, not on retailers. One reason that use-tax payments are low may 
be that consumers simply do not understand that the obligation is theirs. In one 
2011 study, nearly two-thirds of respondents did not know or did not believe 
that they were required to pay use tax on Internet purchases if the tax was not 
collected by the vendor.
101
 In another study, over 45% of the respondents 
reported that they did not pay use tax because either the retailer did not charge 
the tax or because they were unaware of their liability.
102
 In another study, over 
65% of Florida participants and over 37% of Illinois participants reported 
having no knowledge of use taxes.
103
 Although these data do not speak to the 
reasons for that lack of knowledge, it is plausible that states’ vendor-centric 
approaches and the narrative surrounding “taxing Amazon” may have caused 
consumers to fail to internalize the obligation as their own—even if they are 
aware of the tax.
104
 If that is the case, the collection of use taxes by vendors 
under the Act will only exacerbate the problem because states will continue to 
signal to consumers that vendors will handle their obligations. That, in turn, 
may make it more difficult for states to convince consumers that they have the 
responsibility to remit tax on the purchases for which the tax is not collected by 
the vendor. Similarly, states will have even less reason to enforce use taxes 
against individual consumers because individuals’ liabilities will be even lower. 
 
 98  Baugh et al., supra note 91, at 16. 
 99  Id. 
 100  A recent online article noted this strategy as one of the “20 Secret Tips Everyone Who 
Shops on Amazon Needs To Know.” Richard Padilla, 20 Secret Tips Everyone Who Shops on 
Amazon Needs to Know, BUZZFEED (Jan. 18, 2015, 9:11 AM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/ 
betonnorthshore/secret-amazon-shopping-tips-that-will-save-you-168v4. 
 101  Two-Thirds of Consumers Are Confused by On-Line Sales-Tax Compliance, THE CTR. OF 
SHOPPING (July 28, 2011), http://www.thecenterofshopping.com/blog/two-thirds-of-consumers-
are-confused-by-online-sales-tax-compliance. 
 102  Geoffrey Propheter, Use Tax Awareness and Compliance: A Survey Analysis, 65 ST. TAX 
NOTES 257, 258 tbl.1 (2012). 
 103  Christopher Jones & Yuyun Sejati, Improving Use-Tax Compliance by Decreasing Effort 
and Increasing Knowledge, 11 ATA J. OF LEGAL TAX RES. 1, 10 (2013). The authors note that the 
difference in knowledge levels may be due to the inclusion of a line-item on the Illinois income 
tax return specifically for use taxes. Id. at 9. Florida has no income tax, so it cannot rely on that 
method. 
 104  Thanks to Brian Lepard for this observation. 
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The sum of this discussion is that states should not be optimistic that 
the Marketplace Fairness Act, or similar legislation, would significantly close 
the current use-tax gap. The Act simply does not extend far enough and 
consumer demand flows to areas where the taxing authority cannot reach. Thus, 
even if Congress were to pass the Act, states would still have an economic need 
to take consumer-centric enforcement activity. 
C. The Moral Case for a Consumer-Centric Approach 
The economic case against relying on vendor-centric approaches to 
use-tax compliance is strong, and states should be reasonably concerned about 
relying on those approaches for that reason alone. Notwithstanding that 
pragmatic issue, though, states should also note that the failure to think about 
individual compliance has resulted in a tax that raises significant moral 
questions. This moral claim regarding use taxes rests both on their overall 
design and on their current nonenforcement. 
The concept of morality is incredibly broad and implicates a significant 
amount of work by legal scholars and philosophers. It is thus important to note 
at the outset that this Article does not address the morality of the substance of 
the use-tax laws,
105
 but addresses morality from a procedural perspective. That 
is, are governments legitimately exercising their power in adopting and 
administering the tax? The use tax raises moral concerns under that formulation 
for two primary reasons: (1) because states continue to urge taxpayers to pay 
the tax, but they do not take enforcement action against those who fail to 
comply;
106
 and (2) because compliance with the tax is virtually impossible. 
Those aspects of the tax are discussed below. 
1. The Morality of Nonenforcement 
Incongruity between the law as written and as applied by the 
government has long been recognized as raising moral questions.
107
 A 
 
 105  One could, for example, raise a moral argument regarding the regressive nature of 
consumption taxes in general, or about specific aspects of those taxes that make them more 
regressive (e.g., the inclusion of clothing or food in the tax base). 
 106  This is not to say that there is no use-tax enforcement, but that enforcement is generally 
reserved for individuals who make very large purchases without paying use tax. See McIntyre v. 
Farr, No. 09-2145-III (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Jan. 26, 2012) (imposition of use tax on an airplane); Simon 
v. Director, Div. of Tax’n, 24 N.J. T.C. 509 (2009) (addressing application of use tax to the 
purchase of a sailboat); Suzanne Beaudelaire, California Art Collectors Be Warned!, 31 ST. TAX 
NOTES 1098 (2004) (discussing enforcement action against those with purchases of significant 
artwork); Mike Maciag, Use Tax Revenues: How Much Are States Not Collecting?, GOVERNING 
(May 1, 2012), http://www.governing.com/blogs/by-the-numbers/state-use tax-collection-
revenues.html (noting that “[s]tates rarely pursue those who skirt use tax obligations” and that 
“[t]argeting use tax cheats is largely impractical”). 
 107  LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39, 81–91 (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1969); JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 210 (President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. 1999) (1971) 
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government that lays out one set of rules, but that enforces another, raises 
significant questions regarding the legitimacy of its authority.
108
 Complete 
congruity is not essential for these purposes. Resource constraints often prevent 
agencies from perfectly enforcing the laws as written. This particular issue was 
prominent in the public, press, and legal community in 2014 as President 
Obama took administrative action with respect to our nation’s immigration 
laws.
109
 That administrative action took the form of executive actions that, in 
part, expanded programs that deferred removal actions, allowed work 
authorization for certain individuals, and expanded the use of waivers for 
unlawful presences.
110
 The administration noted in the implementation of those 
actions that they were being made out of administrative necessity due to limited 
resources and pursuant to the executive branch’s prosecutorial discretion.111 
 
(discussing the need for governments to take “a conscientious effort . . . to determine whether an 
infraction has taken place and to impose the correct penalty”); JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and 
Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 210, 218 (1979) (noting that “[t]he police should not be 
allowed to allocate its resources so as to avoid all effort to prevent and detect certain crimes or 
prosecute certain classes of criminals”). Fuller recognized that enforcement resources are limited, 
but suggested that incongruent enforcement be carefully evaluated. Lon L. Fuller, A Reply to 
Professors Cohen and Dworkin, 10 VILL. L. REV. 655, 663 (1965). The “conscientious 
prosecutor” should ask at least whether there is a pattern of discrepancy between the law as 
enforced and as written and whether any resulting revision to the laws is defensible. Id. 
 108  The problems with the congruence requirement are not only moral, but constitutional. In 
recent years, a number of questions have arisen out of the Obama administration’s decision to not 
enforce controversial laws regarding immigration and same-sex marriage. Scholars have thus 
recently evaluated the permissibility of the executive branch’s discretionary power. See, e.g., 
Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031 (2013); Robert J. 
Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream on: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of 
Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781 (2013); 
Jospeph Landau, DOMA and Presidential Discretion: Interpreting and Enforcing Federal Law, 
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 619 (2012); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 
67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 688 (2014); Michael Sant’ Ambrogio, The Extra-Legislative Veto, 102 
GEO. L.J. 351 (2014). Use-tax nonenforcement clearly does not garner the same level of political 
interest as the federal policies discussed above. It is also fueled not as much by politics, but by 
economic compulsion. (Some governors may feel politically precluded from enforcing the tax, 
but that is likely more on general anti-tax grounds than on a specific substantive rejection of 
consumption taxes on Internet commerce with remote vendors qua Internet commerce with 
remote vendors). Many of the same considerations arise, though, when talking about use-tax 
nonenforcement. Notwithstanding those questions, this Article will focus only on the moral 
dimension of nonenforcement and leave the legal questions for another day. 
 109  Michael D. Shear, Obama, Daring Congress, Acts to Overhaul Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 20, 2014, at A1; Executive Actions on Immigration, USCIS [hereinafter USCIS, Executive 
Actions], http://www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction (last visited Oct. 8, 2015); Fixing the System: 
President Obama Is Taking Action on Immigration, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/immigration/immigration-action (last visited Oct. 8, 2015). 
 110  USCIS, Executive Actions, supra note 109. 
 111  See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas 
S. Winkowski, Acting Direct, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf; 
Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), USCIS, 
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The rationale given for these actions is consistent with what can be 
termed a “worst-first” enforcement methodology where an agency pursues only 
the most brazen offenders or those causing the highest social harm.
112
 For 
example, it is more reasonable to dedicate police efforts to stopping individuals 
going 20 miles over the speed limit than two miles over the speed limit. It is 
similarly more reasonable to direct significant enforcement effort to stopping 
concentrated sources of file sharing rather than to stopping one individual who 
downloads a pirated movie. 
Use-tax nonenforcement certainly shares similarities with these 
situations. Most use-tax violations would appear to be “minor” since 
individuals generally owe non-substantial amounts of that tax. Auditing these 
individuals would thus appear to be a misuse of enforcement resources.
113
 
There is also some enforcement effort aimed at “bigger” offenders.114 
Notwithstanding those factors, though, use-tax nonenforcement also differs 
from the nonenforcement of other laws because, in part, states continue to 
affirmatively compel individuals to pay use taxes, through their tax returns, 
instructions, websites, and other interactions with taxpayers.
115
 Those 
 
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2015) (noting that “[d]eferred action is a use of prosecutorial discretion to defer 
removal action against an individual for a certain period of time”). 
 112  The use of these enforcement strategies in the tax law has been extensively analyzed 
recently. See Leigh Osofsky, Concentrated Enforcement, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 325, 333–38 (2014) 
(discussing the use of worst-first enforcement strategies). 
 113  Individual use-tax audits may not make economic sense in isolation, but that does not 
mean that states have no options to compel compliance. As an initial matter, they could audit use-
tax compliance with any income tax audit. They could also easily respond to returns reporting 
absolutely zero use tax with a letter. The simple act of noticing taxpayer error and informing 
taxpayers of that fact is a form of sanction that could have a positive impact on reporting rates. 
See Thimmesch, supra note 67 (manuscript at 38–39). States can also direct attention directly to 
tax-return preparers who consistently file returns showing no use tax due. A full list of ideas for 
use-tax enforcement is beyond the scope of this paper, but suffice it to say that states must look 
beyond the simple expected value of a single audit. If nothing else, research shows that 
individual audits have a multiplier effect in that people who hear about audits are more likely to 
comply themselves. See Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-
Penalty Regimes, 44 CONN. L. REV. 675, 711 n.145 (2012) (listing studies establishing this 
“indirect audit effect”). See generally Thimmesch, supra note 67 (providing a comprehensive 
discussion of the ways in which states could leverage research on tax compliance to help build a 
compliance norm with respect to state use taxes). 
 114 See sources cited supra note 106. 
 115 See, e.g., Consumer Use Tax Return and Instructions, COLORADO, 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/DR0252.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2015) 
(requiring the payment of use taxes); Do You Owe Use Tax?, DEP’T OF REVENUE WASH. ST., 
http://dor.wa.gov/Content/GetAFormOrPublication/PublicationBySubject/TaxTopics/UseTax.asp
x (last visited Oct. 8, 2015) (discussing the variety of ways in which states have included use tax 
line items on their tax returns); Holiday Shoppers May Owe Use Tax on Internet Purchases, 
IDAHO ST. TAX COMMISSION (Nov. 25, 2014), http://tax.idaho.gov/n-feed.cfm?idd=523 
(informing consumers of their use tax responsibilities); Manzi, supra note 4 (discussing the 
variety of ways in which states have included use-tax line items on their tax returns); Questions 
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communications all continue to articulate that taxpayers must comply and even 
reference the very situations where use-tax compliance is the most difficult—
situations where taxpayers purchase items at lower tax rates in other states.
116
 
Some states also have voluntary disclosure programs that specifically reference 
enforcement action and individuals’ potential liabilities for taxes due in past 
years.
117
 These communications are problematic because they are in stark 
contrast to the reality of how use taxes are currently being administered. They 
serve only to prey upon our “Washingtons,” and they thus make fools of those 
who we should hold out as models. Those who listen to the appeals of the state 
bear the entire burden of the tax while their less impressionable peers escape 
sanction. A state cannot morally place citizens in this position. If states are not 
going to enforce the tax, they cannot continue to threaten sanction. 
Notwithstanding this analysis, it may seem too bold to claim that a 
state’s failure to enforce this tax necessarily means that it has a moral 
obligation to abandon the tax altogether. States continue to urge compliance 
with speeding limits, for example, even though violations at the margin appear 
to be rarely enforced. Are state speeding limits thus immoral as well? There are 
two immediate responses to this line of inquiry. First, morality is not 
necessarily binary. Something is not either moral or immoral. Rather, the 
morality of the law lies on a spectrum, and each individual factor must be 
evaluated and measured with other aspects of that law.
118
 The lack of 
 
and Answers Regarding Use Tax, ST. OF NEV. DEP’T OF TAX’N, http://tax.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/ 
taxnvgov/Content/TaxLibrary/TPI-01_02_Use_Tax_Questions_and_Answers_04-09-
09%5B1%5D.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2015) (discussing the variety of ways in which states have 
included use-tax line items on their tax returns); Sales & Use Tax, KY.GOV, 
http://revenue.ky.gov/Business/salesanduse.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2015) (informing consumers 
of their use-tax responsibilities); Paying Individual Use Tax for Online, Out-of-State or 
Catalogue Purchases, MASS.GOV [hereinafter Paying Individual Use Tax], 
http://www.mass.gov/dor/all-taxes/sales-and-use/individual-use-tax/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2015) 
(discussing the variety of ways in which states have included use tax line items on their tax 
returns). 
 116  See, e.g., PA. DEP’T OF REVENUE, USE TAX FOR INDIVIDUALS  2 (2015), 
http://www.revenue.pa.gov/FormsandPublications/FormsforBusinesses/Documents/Sales-
Use%20Tax/rev-1748.pdf; MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, MINNESOTA SALES AND USE TAX 
INSTRUCTION BOOKLET 3 (2014), http://www.revenue.state.mn.us/Forms_and_Instructions/sales_ 
tax_booklet.pdf; S.D. EFORM- 1350 V10, at 1 (2011), 
https://www.state.sd.us/eforms/secure/eforms/E1350V10-UseTaxForm.pdf; Paying Individual 
Use Tax, supra note 115; Use Tax on Art Acquisitions by Individuals, DEP’T OF REVENUE WASH. 
ST. [hereinafter Use Tax on Art Acquisitions], 
http://dor.wa.gov/Docs/Pubs/ExciseTax/RetailSales_UseTax/UseTaxOnArtQAs.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 16, 2015). 
 117  See, e.g., Disclosure of Use Tax for In-State Consumers, CA.GOV, http://www.boe.ca.gov/ 
sutax/isvdprog.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2015); Illinois Use Tax, ILL. REVENUE, 
http://www.revenue.state.il.us/Individuals/Illinois-Use-tax.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2015); Use 
Tax on Art Acquisitions, supra note 116, at 2. 
 118  See SURI RATNAPALA, JURISPRUDENCE 170–71 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009); Bruce P. 
Frohnen, The Irreducible, Minimal Morality of Law: Reconsidering the Positivist/Natural Law 
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enforcement of use taxes, then, simply adds to the complete picture of the 
morality of the law. 
In addition, one must realize that tax-law nonenforcement has a 
particularly uneasy tone as compared to the nonenforcement of other laws 
because of the presence of a tax return. As noted above, individuals in many 
states are required to declare their use-tax liabilities on their annual income-tax 
returns.
119
 That return-filing requirement means that individuals are required to 
affirmatively certify, at least annually, that they have complied with their tax 
obligations. A taxpayer must therefore either truthfully report her use taxes or 
knowingly file an incorrect return. The latter is generally tax fraud, which can 
be a felony.
120
 
Tax returns also generally include a jurat, which requires the taxpayer 
to attest to the accuracy of the return, often under penalties of perjury.
121
 
 
Divide in Light of Legal Purpose and the Rule of Law, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 467, 475–78 (2014) 
(providing a summary of Thomas Aquinas’s natural-law philosophy and concluding that “at least 
for Aquinas, law exists on a continuum from just to unjust, true to perverse or crooked, pure to 
corrupt”). 
 119  See Manzi, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that 27 states include a use-tax line item on their 
income-tax returns). 
 120  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-18-202 (2015) (providing that the willful failure to pay a 
tax or file a return is a felony); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-428 (2015) (classifying the willful 
delivery of a return that is known to be fraudulent or false in any material matter as a felony); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 131.445(2) (LexisNexis 2015) (classifying the willful submission of a 
false return with the intent to evade payment of tax as a felony); 68 OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 241 
(2015) (classifying the filing of a false or fraudulent return as a felony); WASH. REV. CODE § 
82.32.290(2)(a)(iii), (b) (2015) (same). 
 121  See, e.g., STATE OF CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., 2014 CALIFORNIA RESIDENT INCOME TAX 
RETURN FORM 540 (2014), 
https://www.ftb.ca.gov/forms/2014/14_540.pdf?WT.mc_id=Individuals_Popular_540form; 
IDAHO STATE TAX COMM’N, FORM 40 IDAHO INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN (2014), 
http://tax.idaho.gov/forms/EFO00089_10-14-2014.pdf; KAN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, FORM K-40 
(2014), http://www.ksrevenue.org/pdf/k-4014.pdf; ME. DEP’T OF ADMIN. & FIN. SERVS., MAINE 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX FORM 1040ME (2014), http://www.maine.gov/ 
revenue/forms/1040/2014/14_1040me_downloadable.pdf; MICH. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 
26; NEB. DEP’T OF REVENUE, NEBRASKA INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN FORM 1040N (2014), 
http://www.revenue.nebraska.gov/tax/14forms/f_1040n.pdf; OHIO DEP’T OF TAXATION, FORM IT 
1040 (2014), http://www.tax.ohio.gov/Portals/0/forms/ 
ohio_individual/individual/2014/PIT_IT1040.pdf; UTAH STATE TAX COMM’N, UTAH INDIVIDUAL 
INCOME TAX RETURN FORM TC-40 (2014), http://tax.utah.gov/forms/current/tc-40.pdf; VT. DEP’T 
OF TAXES, VERMONT INCOME TAX RETURN FORM IN-111 (2014), http://www.state.vt.us/tax/ 
pdf.word.excel/forms/income/2014/2014-IN-111-web.pdf. In the area of taxation, the penalties 
for perjury and for perjurous statements can be complicated. Under federal law, there is a 
substantive difference between a charge of perjury and the related charge under the tax code. 
Perjury is punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 1621 and requires the filing of a return, specifically 
under penalty of perjury, that “willfully subscribes as true any material matter which [the 
taxpayer] does not believe to be true.” 18 U.S.C. § 1621(2) (2012). Under the tax law, a felony is 
also imposed for making “a false declaration under penalties of perjury.” 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). 
That charge is not technically a perjury charge. See Escobar v. United States, 388 F.2d 661, 664–
65 (1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 1024 (1968). It is a separate crime based on a perjurous 
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Perjury, like fraud, is a serious crime. Use-tax noncompliance thus requires a 
taxpayer to commit legal violations in addition to simply failing to pay the 
amounts technically owed. This factor serves to differentiate use-tax 
nonenforcement from other types of nonenforcement. If a taxpayer were 
required to annually certify, under penalties of perjury, that she had not sped 
during the year, we might view that legal requirement differently. The annual 
certification process simply makes use-tax compliance and use-tax 
nonenforcement much different than similar positions with respect to other 
laws.
122
 
Of course, one may feel disinclined to give these considerations any 
weight given this Article’s explicit admission that use taxes are unenforced. Of 
what consequence is a potential charge for fraud or perjury if we know that the 
charges will never occur? Indeed, without consequence, it is debatable whether 
a law can be immoral at all.
123
 To many, then, the moral appeals made herein 
may be made impotent. The lack of consequence may indicate that there is no 
use-tax obligation at all, and that as a result, any references to fraud and perjury 
are of no consequence. This analysis, however, falls short. There are at least 
two ways in which use-tax noncompliance does have consequence regardless of 
states’ current nonenforcement postures. 
First, requiring taxpayers to either pay a tax that their neighbors do not 
pay or to become a fraudster and perjurer is a consequence in and of itself. 
Many appropriately feel aversion to committing those offenses, or felonies in 
general. Even if the tax is not enforced, the internal psychological sanction of 
 
statement. The charge is often a lesser-included offense of tax fraud or tax evasion because the 
perjury charge does not require that any tax was avoided. See ROBERT S. FINK, TAX FRAUD—
AUDITS, INVESTIGATIONS, PROSECUTIONS § 16.02 (2001); MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN & LESLIE BOOK, 
IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶ 7A.04[1] (2d ed. 2014). See generally United States v. Bishop, 
412 U.S. 346 (1973) (evaluating the difference between the two penalty provisions). The crime 
does, however, require that a false statement on a return be “material.” See 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). 
Under the federal law, this does not mean that the amount is substantial, just that the item being 
reported is material. Thus, false statements as to gross income have been held to be material 
without regard to the amount of income omitted. United States v. Clavey, 578 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 
1978) (en banc); United States v. DiVarco, 484 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 
U.S. 916 (1974). In addition, an incorrect claim for a deduction was held to be material even 
though no tax was owed when the error was corrected. United States v. Farnan, 948 F.2d 1283 
(4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 913 (1992). For purposes of this discussion, the semantic 
difference between a perjury charge and a charge based on a perjurous statement is without 
effect. Outside of a few highly specialized lawyers, the difference is likely unknown and, even if 
known, of no effect. The material factors are that knowingly making a false statement on a tax 
return can be a crime and that it can be a felony. 
 122  These problems are even more troubling once one realizes that even our Washingtons 
likely know that they cannot fully recount their transactions for the year. Under current law, even 
they can hardly claim that their returns are accurate or that they did not knowingly fail to report 
any liability. 
 123  See Ronald Dworkin, Philosophy, Morality, and Law: Observations Prompted by 
Professor Fuller’s Novel Claim, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 668, 674–75 (1965) (noting that violations of 
Fuller’s canons have “no moral flavor at all” if they have no consequences). 
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having to commit those offenses should not be ignored.
124
 It is no small relief to 
one burdened by these internal consequences to say that the law was no law 
from a philosophical standpoint or that the law is not, or likely will not be, 
enforced. Second, we must remain mindful that states can change their 
nonenforcement postures and seek back use taxes from consumers and impose 
significant penalties for their noncompliance, each to the extent that the 
applicable statutes of limitation allow. Taxpayers thus bear the risk of sanctions 
even though the tax is currently unenforced. This cannot be accepted. If the 
state is to hold that power over individuals, it should be responsible for making 
a meaningful effort to punish those who ignore the mandate. If it is unwilling to 
do so, the moral approach would be to relieve taxpayers of the burden through 
a change in law or a binding nonenforcement position. 
2. The Moral Implications of the Difficulty of Use-Tax Compliance 
States’ nonenforcement postures are also troubling because they have 
allowed states to ignore significant problems with how those taxes are 
structured. It seems obvious to say that a law that requires one to perform an 
impossible task is immoral and fails to rise to the level of something that can be 
respected as “law” under a rule-of-law framework.125 A statute requiring that a 
person be in two places at once, for example, would be a mere penalty on 
existence. It would represent nothing more than a naked use of force against the 
governed. Of course, the line between something that is extremely difficult and 
something that is impossible is not clear.
126
 The former might be “harsh and 
 
 124  See James Alm, Gary H. McClelland & William D. Schulze, Changing the Social Norm of 
Tax Compliance by Voting, 52 KYKLOS 141, 149 (1999) (recognizing that taxpayers may suffer a 
psychological loss by evading taxes); Ronald G. Cummings, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Michael 
McKee & Benno Torgler, Tax Morale Affects Tax Compliance: Evidence from Surveys and an 
Artefactual Field Experiment, 70 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 447, 449 (2009) (noting the “psychic 
cost associated with evading one’s own tax liability”); Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, The Psychic 
Cost of Tax Evasion, 56 B.C. L. REV. 617, 619 (2015) (discussing the psychological discomfort 
taxpayers feel when evading tax). 
 125  See FULLER, supra note 107, at 39 (noting that a law that commands the impossible is not 
a valid rule of law); RAWLS, supra note 107, at 208 (“First of all, the actions which the rules of 
law require and forbid should be of a kind which men can reasonably be expected to do and to 
avoid. . . . It must not impose a duty to do what cannot be done.”); RAZ, supra note 107, at 213 
(noting that “the law must be capable of being obeyed”); Frohnen, supra note 118, at 484 (stating 
that “[a] purported law, the sanctions of which are unavoidable (for example, a law imposing the 
death penalty for walking on one’s feet rather than one’s hands), is not a law, according to 
Neumann; it is simply an imposition of punishment” (citing MICHAEL NEUMANN, THE RULE OF 
LAW: POLITICIZING ETHICS 60 (2002))). Fuller specifically noted that there “[c]ertainly . . . can be 
no rational ground for asserting that a man can have a moral obligation to obey a legal rule 
that . . . was unintelligible . . . or commanded the impossible.” FULLER, supra note 107, at 39. 
Similarly, Rawls noted that “[l]aws and commands are accepted as laws and commands only if it 
is generally believed that they can be obeyed and executed.” RAWLS, supra note 107, at 208. 
 126 FULLER, supra note 107, at 79. Fuller’s conception of the morality of law is not without 
debate, but has, however, seen resurgence as of late. See generally KRISTEN RUNDLE, FORMS 
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unfair” but in accordance with the purpose of the legal order. Demands that are 
“patently impossible,” in contrast, conflict with that purpose.127 Such demands 
show an “indifference” to one’s powers of self-determination.128 Laws must 
therefore be designed such that we can reasonably expect compliance.  
As they are currently structured, use taxes are highly problematic under 
this principle because full compliance with those taxes is virtually impossible. 
As discussed above, use taxes apply in many situations. The most well-
understood situation in which they apply is when a taxpayer purchases an item 
online or via catalogue without paying any sales tax.
129
 Use taxes also apply, 
however, when consumers purchase goods in a state without paying sales tax 
and then use the goods in another state.
130
 They also apply when consumers pay 
sales tax at a lower rate than the rate of taxation in their jurisdiction of use.
131
 
Finally, use taxes may apply where an individual purchases and uses property 
in their current home state and then subsequently uses the property in another 
state, perhaps after a change of residence.
132
 
The use tax likely violates the principle of possibility in all but the first 
situation. That situation (i.e., Internet and catalogue purchases) likely survives 
scrutiny for two principal reasons. First, those transactions are almost certainly 
completed using a form of exchange that creates a paper trail, at least digitally. 
Purchases on the Internet and through catalogues would generally involve a 
credit or debit card, and perhaps a check. As a result, taxpayers can effectively 
track their purchasing activities. Second, with respect to Internet purchases, 
even where a taxpayer does not track those purchases through their bank or 
 
LIBERATE: RECLAIMING THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LON L FULLER (2012) (providing a detailed look 
and reconceptualization of Fuller’s legal theory); Mark Bennett, Leaving the Hart-Fuller Debate 
and Reclaiming Fuller: Form, Agency, and Morality in Kristen Rundle’s Forms Liberate, 44 
VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 461 (2013) (reviewing Kristen Rundle’s analysis and offering 
a complimentary view of Fuller’s work); Frohnen, supra note 118 (arguing that law’s intrinsic 
purpose—to provide order—is a moral good in line with Fuller’s concept of internal morality); 
Colleen Murphy, Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law, 24 L. & PHIL. 239 (2005) 
(defending “Lon Fuller’s view that the rule of law has conditional non-instrumental as well as 
instrumental moral value”). It is not important, for purposes of this piece, whether one agrees 
with Fuller’s criterial account or in the non-instrumental value of that account. If use taxes fail to 
be law (in that states have not enacted or administered them in a way that gives them legitimacy), 
a state is on morally questionable grounds if it imposes sanctions on those who fail to pay those 
taxes regardless of which rule of law framework is applied. 
 127  FULLER, supra note 107, at 79. 
 128  Id. at 162. 
 129  See supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text. 
 130  Of course, some states impose their use tax in that situation only if the goods were 
purchased for use within their boundaries and other states impose their use tax simply if the 
goods are so used. See supra Part II.B. Under the latter type of statute, there is a difference 
between a meal purchased and eaten while on vacation and a souvenir shirt purchased under the 
same conditions. 
 131  See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. 
 132  See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
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credit-card company, their online retailer likely tracks those purchases, or can 
track those purchases if a consumer creates an online account. For example, 
Amazon.com allows users to view their purchases by year under the “Your 
Account” tab at the top of its webpage. The e-tailing platform simply allows for 
information collection and maintenance that is not as readily available in the 
traditional retailing format. 
These compliance-assisting factors do not necessarily apply to the three 
additional categories of purchases noted above. Those three categories all 
generally involve purchases made at a physical store. Unlike purchases made 
online, in-store purchases need not be completed using a credit card and they 
are not likely to be tracked through an accessible customer account. This is not 
to say that these simplification measures could not apply to these categories of 
purchases, but even if a consumer used a credit card for those purchases, for 
example, she would still need to track all of her annual purchases, where she 
used the purchased items, whether tax was collected at the point of sale for 
those items, and, if so, what rate was applied. A credit-card receipt or bank 
statement would provide only one of the necessary items of information. 
This discussion evidences that use-tax compliance is virtually 
impossible in many situations. Taxpayers who travel around the country during 
the course of a year and make purchases using a combination of cash, credit, 
and perhaps check would be able to comply with their state use-tax obligations 
only if they were to keep contemporaneous logs of every remote purchase and 
the state and local sales taxes collected. This is simply impractical. Compliance 
for anyone, then, is an educated guess at best. 
This discussion has not yet even touched on the obligation of an 
individual who changes residences after acquiring property for many years. 
What rate of sales tax did he pay on his purchase of the lawn mower or the 
silverware? All of the issues discussed above are thus magnified when a state 
imposes its use tax without a first-use exception. 
This analysis suggests that the use tax does indeed raise moral 
questions, but the claims regarding the impossibility of compliance should not 
be overstated. Compliance is technically possible if one assumes a taxpayer 
who structures her affairs so carefully as to track, examine, and recall every 
transaction. One could thus argue that compliance with these taxes is simply 
extremely difficult and that no moral issue is presented.
133
 I argue that this 
pushes that conception too far. To command an individual to be nothing more 
than an accountant carrying a notebook cataloguing the year’s purchases is to 
command something that cannot be respected. It commands a task that is 
unreasonably difficult in light of the regulatory objective. The use tax is not 
intended to guide behavior by requiring taxpayers to direct such a significant 
level of energy towards compliance. Although such burdens may be 
 
 133  See FULLER, supra note 107, at 79. 
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appropriate when the end goal is furthered by those actions,
134
 cataloging one’s 
daily affairs with the zeal of the most dutiful bookkeeper does not further the 
goal of raising revenue in and of itself. The use tax, in its current form, simply 
imposes an obligation with so many costs (social, opportunity, etc.) that it is 
fair to categorize as a tax with which compliance is practically impossible.
135
 
D. The Psychological Case for a Consumer-Centric Approach 
This Section critiques use-tax nonenforcement based on its likely 
impact on taxpayers’ motivations to comply with the tax laws more generally. 
To understand that impact, one must first recognize that a number of factors go 
into a person’s decision of whether to comply with a particular government 
mandate.
136
 One of those factors is a person’s view of the legitimacy of that 
government’s authority.137 Indeed, people who view an authority as legitimate 
are generally more likely to comply with the commands of that authority 
regardless of their personal feelings regarding the desirability of the 
commanded act.
138
 Undermining that legitimacy can thus have a negative 
impact on compliance and should be avoided. 
Research suggests that the legitimacy of government is determined in 
part by citizens’ perceptions of the trustworthiness of government and by their 
perceptions of the fairness of the processes used by government.
139
 Though 
 
 134  Take for example, onerous safety regulations. The very acts required to come into 
compliance may likely serve the end goal of safety in and of themselves. 
 135  Of course, the moral concerns stemming from the impossibility of compliance may be 
lessened or eliminated by the nonenforcement of the use tax. As discussed above, however, 
states’ nonenforcement positions do not mitigate the moral problems inherent in the use tax. 
States continue to compel individuals to comply and to require them to attest to the veracity of 
their tax-return positions. For the same reasons that we cannot excuse states’ nonenforcement 
generally, we cannot excuse a system with which compliance is not possible. 
 136  See generally Thimmesch, supra note 67 (manuscript at 7–22) (discussing the theories 
regarding why people comply with the tax laws and how they apply to use taxes). 
 137  TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 25–27 (Princeton Univ. Press 2006) (1990); 
Margaret Levi, Audrey Sacks & Tom Tyler, Conceptualizing Legitimacy, Measuring 
Legitimating Beliefs, 53 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 354, 354–56 (2009) [hereinafter Levi, 
Conceptualizing Legitimacy]. See generally Margaret Levi, Tom R. Tyler & Audrey Sacks, The 
Reasons for Compliance with Law, in UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ACTION, PROMOTING HUMAN 
RIGHTS 70 (Ryan Goodman, Derek Jinks & Andrew K. Woods eds., 2012) [hereinafter Levi, 
Reasons for Compliance] (describing research results that support the claim that individuals’ 
views regarding the legitimacy of government authority impact voluntary compliance rates). 
 138  See TYLER, supra note 137, at 57–62; see also Levi, Conceptualizing Legitimacy, supra 
note 137, at 354–55. 
 139  See Levi, Conceptualizing Legitimacy, supra note 137, at 356. This research differentiates 
between “value-based legitimacy” and “behavioral legitimacy.” Id. The former refers to 
individuals’ internal sense that they should obey a government mandate. Id. The latter refers to 
whether they actually do so. Id. The research of Levi, Tyler, and Sacks suggests that value-based 
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these two concepts are related, they are distinct.
140
 Citizens’ perceptions 
regarding the trustworthiness of government depend on their judgments 
regarding the motivations of government officials and of those officials’ 
competency and performance.
141
 Citizens’ perceptions regarding procedural 
justice, on the other hand, more specifically depend on the fairness of the 
processes used by government in its interaction with citizens.
142
 
The positive relationship between trust in government and voluntary 
compliance
143
 is impacted by a number of factors, including citizens’ 
perceptions regarding the way in which government exercises its power
144
 and 
citizens’ perceptions of the government’s administrative competency.145 
Importantly, citizens’ competency judgments are partially based on their 
evaluations of whether the government will enforce the laws against those who 
do not comply.
146
 That is because “coercion is important for reassuring citizens 
that others will be punished. It signals government competence and protects 
citizens from being a sucker while others free ride.”147 In one study, citizen 
perception that the government was competent and honest translated into a 15 
percentage point increase in the probability that a taxpayer would accept a tax 
 
legitimacy enhances behavioral legitimacy. Levi, Reasons for Compliance, supra note 137, at 
82–84. That is, when people feel an obligation to comply with the law, they generally do so. 
 140  Levi, Reasons for Compliance, supra note 137, at 72. 
 141  Id. 
 142  TYLER, supra note 137, at 174–76. 
 143  TOM BEERS, ERIC LOPRESTI & ERIC SAN JUAN, FACTORS INFLUENCING VOLUNTARY 
COMPLIANCE BY SMALL BUSINESSES: PRELIMINARY SURVEY RESULTS 13–14 (2012), 
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2012-Annual-Report/downloads/Research-Studies-Factors-
Influencing-Voluntary-Compliance-by-Small-Businesses-Preliminary-Survey-Results.pdf 
(reporting that taxpayers in a high-compliance group were more likely to trust the government); 
ERIC KIRCHLER, THE ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF TAX BEHAVIOUR 202–06 (2007); Katharina 
Gangl et al., “How Can I Help You?” Perceived Service Orientation of Tax Authorities and Tax 
Compliance, 69 PUB. FIN. ANALYSIS 487, 500–04 (2013). 
 144  Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Deterrence and Tax Morale: How Tax Administrations and 
Taxpayers Interact, 3 OECD PAPERS 1 (2003), http://www.oecd.org/tax/ 
administration/2789923.pdf; Gangl et al., supra note 143, at 501–04; Erich Kirchler, Erik Hoelzl 
& Ingrid Wahl, Enforced Versus Voluntary Tax Compliance: The “Slippery Slope” Framework, 
29 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 210, 213 (2008). 
 145  Levi, Reasons for Compliance, supra note 137, at 73; Margaret Levi & Audrey Sacks, 
Legitimating Beliefs: Sources and Indicators 12, 15–16 (Afrobarometer, Working Paper No. 74, 
2007) [hereinafter Levi, Legitimating Beliefs], http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/ 
publications/Working%20paper/AfropaperNo74.pdf. 
 146  Levi, Reasons for Compliance, supra note 137, at 73; Levi, Legitimating Beliefs, supra 
note 145, at 12, 15–16. In this way, enforcement impacts both taxpayers’ views of retributive and 
procedural justice. This is very important in our discussion of use-tax compliance because 
enforcement of those taxes is virtually nonexistent. 
 147  Levi, Reasons for Compliance, supra note 137, at 73. 
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administrator’s authority.148 That result is consistent with the results of research 
on the role and importance of retributive justice in society.
149
 Although the 
reasons for why individuals care about retributive justice are uncertain, 
individuals do generally care that those who do not comply with social norms 
are sanctioned.
150
 Those sanctions can be monetary or social, but justice 
requires some signal that the noncompliant behavior was deviant. 
Significant research also establishes that citizens’ beliefs regarding the 
legitimacy of government are tied to concepts of procedural justice.
151
 At a base 
level, citizens care about the decision-making process and think about 
“representation, neutrality, bias, honesty, quality of decision, and 
consistency.”152 They “value being treated politely and having respect shown 
for their rights.”153 As a result, individuals may be motivated to comply based 
more on the fairness of their prior interactions with an authority than on the 
actual outcomes of those interactions.
154
 
In the tax context, a procedural-justice framework would suggest that 
the tone and method of the taxing authority’s communications with taxpayers155 
 
 148  Id. at 79–80, 80 n.7. Those results were based on survey data from a number of sub-
Saharan African countries. Id. at 77. 
 149  See generally KIRCHLER, supra note 143, at 87–90 (discussing retributive justice as it 
relates to fairness); TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 103–32 (1997) 
(discussing research on retributive justice). 
 150  See, e.g., TYLER ET AL., supra note 149, at 106–11. 
 151  See Levi, Conceptualizing Legitimacy, supra note 137, at 359–60; see also TYLER, supra 
note 137, at 170–73. 
 152  TYLER ET AL., supra note 137, at 175. 
 153  Id. 
 154  This work has been extended specifically to tax compliance with generally positive results. 
In one study, a citizens’ belief that the government operated in a procedurally just manner 
corresponded to a 19 percentage-point increase in the probability that the taxpayer would defer to 
the authority of the tax administrator. Levi, Reasons for Compliance, supra note 137, at 80 & n.9. 
A study performed in Australia also showed a positive impact on compliance when fairness 
concepts were incorporated into “reminder” letters that were sent to taxpayers. Michael Wenzel, 
Principles of Procedural Fairness in Reminder Letters: A Field-Experiment 29 (Austl. Nat’l 
Univ. Ctr. for Tax Sys. Integrity, Working Paper No. 42, 2002), http://hdl.handle.net/1885/42671 
(“The present study yielded some, but largely patchy, evidence for the assumption that 
procedural justice principles in reminder letters improve levels of compliance with the 
reminders.”). Other studies on the interplay between procedural justice and tax compliance show 
similar results. See, e.g., BEERS, LOPRESTI & SAN JUAN, supra note 143, at 15 (reporting that 
principles of procedural justice appear to impact taxpayer behavior); Martina Hartner et al., 
Procedural Fairness and Tax Compliance, 38 ECON. ANALYSIS & POL. 137, 149 (2008) 
(reporting a “clear direct effect of procedural justice on motivational postures” in all sampled 
groups); Kristina Murphy, Procedural Justice and Tax Compliance, 38 AUSTL. J. OF SOC. ISSUES 
379, 389–97 (2003) (evaluating the negative impacts of enforcement actions on tax compliance). 
 155  See generally Feld & Frey, supra note 144 (establishing “a systematic relationship 
between external intervention (in this case, how the tax officials deal with taxpayers) and 
intrinsic motivation (in this case, individuals’ tax morale)”); Michael Hallsworth et al., The 
Behavioralist as Tax Collector: Using Natural Field Experiments to Enhance Tax Compliance 
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and their respect for taxpayers
156
 matter. Additionally, it would suggest that a 
taxpayer undergoing an audit will base her opinion of the revenue authority on 
how well she is treated in the audit, rather than on the results of the audit.
157
 A 
commitment to procedural justice would seem to require that taxpayers not be 
penalized harshly for violations that were not purposeful, involved de minimis 
amounts, involved unclear law, or that were previously unenforced. The 
essence of procedural justice is “the commitment of government to uphold the 
laws fairly and to apply them equally to all.”158 Any violation of those 
fundamental concepts of fairness threatens to undermine citizens’ views of the 
legitimacy of the government’s authority. 
States’ nonenforcement of the use tax is likely to have an impact on 
taxpayers’ views of the legitimacy of their states’ revenue authorities under 
both the competency—and thus trust—and procedural-justice frameworks.159 
States currently implore citizens to pay those taxes and threaten them with 
penalties for noncompliance.
160
 When they fail to follow through on those 
threats even against the most brazen offenders, their credibility takes a 
significant hit. It also results in a procedurally unjust administration of the tax 
laws. As noted above, the impact of those postures is that the use tax is an 
implicit tax on honesty. It treats the honest as “suckers”161 while letting the 
remainder go without rebuke. That result would surely not be adopted as a 
legislative matter, and to administer the tax to bring about the same result is 
highly problematic. It reflects an inequitable administrative choice that fails to 
 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20007, 2014), http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w20007 (focusing on the “timely payment of taxes” rather than “the honest declaration of 
income”); Michael Wenzel, A Letter from the Tax Office: Compliance Effects of Informational 
and Interpersonal Justice, 19 SOC. JUST. RES. 345 (2006) (testing the “effects of an authority’s 
fairness . . . on perceptions of fairness and actual compliance”). 
 156  KIRCHLER, supra note 143, at 84–85; Murphy, supra note 154, at 381. 
 157  KIRCHLER, supra note 143, at 84–85. 
 158  Levi, Reasons for Compliance, supra note 137, at 74. 
 159  Levi, Tyler, and Sacks found that incompetency does not directly influence individuals’ 
perceptions of government legitimacy, but it did so through the mediating variable of trust. Levi, 
Reasons for Compliance, supra note 137, at 76. 
 160  See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text. It might be a different matter if states 
simply ignored their use-tax laws, like the many outdated state and local laws that often make 
Internet lists. See, e.g., BIG GOV’T. SMALL BRAINS. DUMB LAWS., http://www.dumblaws.com/ 
(last visited Sept. 7, 2015) (listing so called “dumb laws” in the United States and around the 
globe). These websites often include fake laws, but many are purported to have been verified. 
 161  Levi, Reasons for Compliance, supra note 137, at 73; see Ari Armstrong, Confession of a 
Colorado Use Tax Chump: I Am the 0.08 Percent, COMPLETE COLO.–PAGE TWO (Apr. 9, 2014, 
2:13 PM), http://completecolorado.com/pagetwo/2014/04/09/confession-of-a-colorado-use-tax-
chump-i-am-the-0-08-percent/ (evidencing taxpayer response to the lack of enforcement of use 
taxes); see also Bruce Smith, Letter to the Editor, Apparently Only the Stupid Pay the State Use 
Tax, CASPER STAR TRIB. (July 19, 2014, 9:45 AM), http://trib.com/opinion/letters/smith-
apparently-only-the-stupid-pay-the-state-use-tax/article_122d41a3-2785-57c7-a8be-
05d490f34ee1.html (suggesting that only “the stupid” would pay use tax). 
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respect taxpayers’ rights. Given this enforcement posture, then, our 
Washingtons will likely respond, or have already responded, by losing respect 
for the legitimacy of government and by joining the crowd of those who do not 
comply.
162
 
One might reasonably ask why this analysis matters given that virtually 
no one currently pays the use tax. Citizens who lack trust in the government or 
who feel as though states have acted in a procedurally unjust way cannot pay 
less use tax than what they currently pay. Additionally, these issues cannot 
impact taxpayers who are not even aware of the existence of the tax. These 
observations are apt, but there are at least two reasons that they do not negate 
the importance of this issue. First, as states continue to increase the salience of 
the use tax and the sanctions for non-compliance, they must be concerned that 
they are taken seriously. Taxpayers will ultimately judge the legitimacy of their 
tax administrator when they are confronted with the tax. Second, states must 
think beyond how those judgments impact use-tax collections specifically. 
Taxpayers who do not trust the state revenue authority or who feel that it 
operates in a procedurally unjust manner may feel less inclined to properly 
report their other taxes as well. States should thus recognize that their perceived 
ineptness with regard to the use tax may affect their other efforts. 
In sum, states’ current nonenforcement postures with respect to use 
taxes have the potential to significantly undermine citizens’ views regarding the 
legitimacy of government and their willingness to obey the law. That 
nonenforcement likely impacts citizens’ views regarding the competency of 
government and their views regarding the fairness of government procedures. 
Neither of those impacts is positive. States must take those impacts into 
account when determining how to enforce their taxes. In the context of state use 
taxes, this likely requires a consumer-centric approach. 
E. Other Benefits from Adopting a Consumer-Centric Approach 
The preceding sections have addressed the economic, moral, and 
psychological factors that compel a consumer-centric approach to the state use 
tax. Notably, those factors would compel that approach even if the Marketplace 
Fairness Act were enacted. This Section, however, explores a different set of 
factors that would support adopting a consumer-centric approach instead of 
relying on the Marketplace Fairness Act. Those factors include the avoidance 
of commercial concerns, concerns under the Due Process Clause, and political 
opposition to that Act. 
With respect to the commercial concerns, it is worth noting that the 
Court adopted its physical-presence rule under the Dormant Commerce Clause 
 
 162  See Bryan T. Camp, The Play’s the Thing: A Theory of Taxing Virtual Worlds, 59 
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 22–23 (2007) (noting that the American tax system’s reliance on voluntary 
compliance “will break down when it . . . makes suckers out of compliant taxpayers by imposing 
requirements that are practically unenforceable against noncompliant taxpayers”). 
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because of the impacts that expansive state authority could have on interstate 
commerce.
163
 The Court’s National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of 
Revenue
164
 and Quill decisions also specifically indicated concern for vendors 
whose operations would not support the burdens of complying with multi-state 
tax obligations.
165
 Passage of the Act would raise those same commercial 
concerns. Smaller vendors operating on the Internet would necessarily incur 
costs if they were required to collect and remit sales tax for states across the 
nation. Compliance with those requirements would necessitate the purchase (or 
at least incorporation) of software to determine which items are subject to 
remote states’ taxes and the appropriate levels of tax to charge. 166 Vendors 
would also have to remit the taxes owed and deal with the costs of any audits 
performed by those states. The extent of those costs is subject to debate, but 
could be significant compared to the profits of smaller vendors. As a result, 
much of the opposition of the Act comes from Internet vendors concerned 
about those compliance costs. The Act’s simplification requirements and small-
seller exception are intended to address those concerns, but many disagree that 
they go far enough.
167
 
This Article does not seek to settle this debate. Rather, it will suffice to 
note that there are commercial concerns that have demanded attention by, and 
concession from, states and other proponents of the Act. Those concerns may 
not tip the scales towards rejecting that Act, but they are still a thumb on that 
scale and should not be forgotten in the overall analysis. 
There are also potential Due Process Clause concerns with the Act. 
Under that clause, states lack jurisdiction over nonresidents unless those 
nonresidents have purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of the 
 
 163  Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313–18 (1992). 
 164  386 U.S. 753 (1967). 
 165  See John A. Swain, State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus Standard 
for the Twenty-First Century, 38 GA. L. REV. 343, 356–63 (2003) (noting that “the Court’s 
burdens concern seems to be that businesses with low volume contacts with multiple states may 
have costs of compliance that are excessive in comparison to the amount of business done in 
those states”). 
 166  The Act would require states to provide software to vendors that would calculate the 
appropriate levels of sales tax owed on purchases. See Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015, S. 698, 
114th Cong. § 2(b)(2)(D)(ii) (2015). Despite that requirement, there is no requirement that states’ 
software is complementary or that it can be easily incorporated with the software that the vendor 
uses to run its online sales platform. 
 167  See, e.g., Drexden Davis, Marketplace Fairness Act Is Not Fair to the Marketplace, THE 
HILL: CONGRESS BLOG (Dec. 8, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-
budget/226157-marketplace-fairness-act-is-not-fair-to-the-marketplace; Mckane Davis, The 
Marketplace Fairness Act Will Be as Hard to Implement as Obamacare, THE DAILY CALLER 
(Dec. 4, 2013, 11:24 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2013/12/04/the-marketplace-fairness-act-will-
be-as-hard-to-implement-as-obamacare/; Debunking the Myths Around the Marketplace Fairness 
Act, EBAY MAIN STREET (May 3, 2013), http://www.ebaymainstreet.com/news-events/ 
debunking-myths-around-marketplace-fairness-act (noting that “[s]oftware is not a panacea”). 
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state.
168
 The structure of the small-seller exception raises concerns under that 
constitutional provision because the exception would allow vendors to be 
subject to tax requirements in any conforming state as long as the vendor’s 
aggregate remote sales exceeded $1 million.
169
 This means that a Georgia 
vendor could make $1million of remote sales into New York and $2 of remote 
sales into Nebraska but be subject to Nebraska’s taxing authority. Whether that 
would be permissible under the Due Process Clause is questionable, and 
Congress has no right to authorize that action if barred. Ultimately, the Act, at 
its boundary, raises this Due Process issue, which is similar to those that have 
been debated with respect to the Internet for years.
170
 
Finally, irrespective of these issues, some are simply opposed in 
principle to the cross-border power that the Act would grant. For them, the Act 
authorizes offensive extraterritorial exercises of power regardless of the costs 
imposed on vendors. It allows Nebraska, in our example, to impose burdens 
beyond its boundaries. They thus urge defeat of the Act on those grounds.
171
 
This discussion is not intended to suggest that these factors are 
sufficient to counsel against passage of the Act. Rather, it is intended to point 
out that a consumer-centric approach would simply avoid these concerns 
altogether. Consumers would report their use-tax liabilities directly to their 
states without requiring anything of vendors. Remote vendors would not be 
subjected to audits by remote states and would avoid increased compliance 
costs. There are, then, some benefits to taking a consumer-centric approach in 
lieu of passage of the Act. 
IV. THE CASE FOR NONENFORCEMENT 
The case for a consumer-centric approach to use-tax enforcement is 
compelling, but not without potential critique. First, the costs of increased 
enforcement are certain, but the benefits are speculative. Second, the defects of 
the current system do not manifest themselves concretely or in a way that can 
be directly attributed to the tax’s nonenforcement. Third, citizens may perceive 
use-tax enforcement to be the imposition of a “new” tax, and politicians may 
not be willing to face the scorn that accompanies that suggestion in today’s 
political environment. Finally, some might argue that use-tax nonenforcement 
is justified as a form of assistance to the development and use of the Internet. 
These potential arguments against use-tax enforcement are addressed below. 
 
 168  See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291–98 (1980). 
 169  H.R. 684, 113th Cong. § 2(c) (2013). 
 170  See generally Richard E. Kaye, Internet Web Site Activities of Nonresident Person or 
Corporation as Conferring Personal Jurisdiction Under Long-Arm Statutes and Due Process 
Clause, 81 A.L.R. 5th 41 (2000). 
 171  See Cassandra Carroll, Marketplace Fairness Act Would Cripple Small Businesses, AM. 
FOR TAX REFORM (Oct. 22, 2014, 9:30 AM), http://www.atr.org/marketplace-fairness-act-would-
cripple-small-businesses. 
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A. The Economic Costs of Enforcement 
It is easy to put oneself in the shoes of the tax administrator or state 
politician contemplating these issues. The conclusions of the foregoing analysis 
are that the current nonenforcement of use taxes results in significant revenue 
loss, is morally questionable, and has negative psychological impacts on 
taxpayers. Revenue authorities may feel, however, that the economic costs can 
be recouped through federal intervention and that the costs from an immoral 
and procedurally unfair system of taxation are too speculative, indirect, or 
controversial to necessitate action. In contrast, the costs for states to take 
enforcement action are clear. Any funds that are directed towards use-tax 
enforcement must be diverted from elsewhere. Why would a state redirect 
funds based on these speculative harms? This is an especially apt question since 
states are focusing their attention on the Act and since individual audits would 
appear to provide little, if any, positive net revenue. 
One answer to this critique is that states must look beyond the 
economics of individual audits. Each audit may not independently produce 
gains to the fisc, but enforcement action can have an impact on taxpayers other 
than those being audited. Taxpayers who are aware of enforcement action 
against others may increase their own compliance.
172
 Taxpayer compliance also 
may increase for reasons other than the deterrent or competency effects of 
enforcement action. That action may work to increase compliance simply by 
increasing the salience of the tax. Further, a comprehensive approach to 
promoting compliance could make use of a variety of modern tax-compliance 
theories that could help to promote compliance without relying solely on costly 
audits.
173
 
The problem with these arguments is, of course, that they try to counter 
concerns about the speculative costs of nonenforcement by offering speculative 
gains from enforcement. For the skeptical state policy maker, then, the only 
concrete reason to focus on individual compliance may be that the Act simply 
will not close the use-tax gap. As shown above, even if that legislation were 
passed, less than half of that gap would be closed.
174
 States may win the battle, 
but the war will not be won. 
Finally, it should be noted that cost-benefit analyses have their role, but 
that the indeterminacy of the costs and benefits in this situation does not mean 
that we should not take action. It just means that a more qualitative approach 
should be taken. On that metric, enforcement action is not only warranted, but 
also compelled. 
 
 172  See Morse, supra note 113, at 711 n.145. 
 173  See generally Thimmesch, supra note 67 (manuscript at 34–49). 
 174  See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Politics of Enforcement 
Anyone who follows politics even remotely is aware of the immense 
aversion to any action that can be classified as a “new” tax.175 Unfortunately, 
given the existing norm of use-tax noncompliance, many may consider use-tax 
enforcement to be the imposition of such a tax. This impediment to 
enforcement action is very real and perhaps signals the death knell for use-tax 
reform. To convince states to take consumer-centric enforcement action, then, 
we must convince the politicians that enforcement of the tax does not result in a 
new tax and we must convince their constituents of the same.
176
 The former 
should not be controversial. The use tax is a long-standing tax that has gone 
unenforced for largely economic reasons. Enforcement of the tax would 
represent a “new” tax no more than when the IRS moved to increase 
enforcement on taxpayers who used undisclosed, offshore bank accounts to 
avoid taxation.
177
 Taking effort to reduce tax evasion is not the imposition of a 
new tax. 
There also appears to be a solution for those politicians who simply do 
not want to do anything to increase revenues. A key component of many 
Republican governors’ tax policies has been to advocate for the reduction of 
income taxes and for the further utilization of consumption taxes.
178
 Use-tax 
enforcement would be directly in line with those efforts. States could earmark 
the revenue for precisely that purpose. Indeed, many states have already 
introduced or adopted legislation to that effect. Wisconsin, for example, passed 
legislation that would require the additional revenue collected because of the 
Act to be used to eliminate the state’s alternative minimum tax or to provide an 
 
 175  Individuals’ general aversion to taxes is demonstrated in intriguing behavioral research. 
See generally Kay Blaufus & Axel Mohlmann, Security Returns and Tax Aversion Bias: 
Behavioral Responses to Tax Labels, 15 J. BEHAV. FIN. 56 (2014); Abigail B. Sussman & 
Christopher Y. Olivola, Axe the Tax: Taxes Are Disliked More than Equivalent Costs, 48 J. 
MARKETING RES. 91 (2011); see also Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About 
Tax, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 106, 117–19 (2006). 
 176  Though venturing into the political aspects of tax reform often moves the tax scholar 
outside his or her area of comfort, the realities of the modern day counsel attention to these 
issues. See generally Joseph Bankman & Paul L. Caron, California Dreamin’: Tax Scholarship 
in a Time of Fiscal Crisis, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405 (2014) (critiquing the “dominant 
conception of legal tax scholarship,” which is “apolitical and confined to subjects about which 
the writer can demonstrate mastery,” as “limit[ing] our voice on a subject about which [tax 
scholars] have much to say”). 
 177  See Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-Penalty Regimes, 
44 CONN. L. REV. 675, 711–18 (2012) (describing the IRS’s recent enforcement efforts related to 
the reporting of foreign bank accounts). 
 178  See Richard W. Stevenson, Governors Push Bigger Reliance on Sales Taxes, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/25/us/politics/republican-governors-push-
taxes-on-sales-not-income.html (discussing proposals by Republican governors in Louisiana, 
Nebraska, and Kansas). 
2015] TAXING HONESTY 185 
income-tax reduction.
179
 Ohio enacted legislation that would use the additional 
tax collections to create an “Income Tax Reduction Fund.”180 Utah and Rhode 
Island, in contrast, would use the revenue to reduce their sales-tax rates.
181
 
Other states have proposed legislation adopting a number of methods for using 
that revenue.
182
 
This discussion regarding the use of funds may create tension for those 
who are discontent with the general regressivity of state tax systems. Any 
increased reliance on consumption taxes will generally lead to a more 
regressive state-tax structure, especially if that increased revenue is offset with 
cuts to the most (and perhaps only) progressive state tax—the state income 
tax.
183
 This concern is limited somewhat when discussing use-tax enforcement 
because we would expect that the current use-tax noncompliance has had a 
regressive impact on our tax system. Our poorest are not likely incurring large 
use-tax liabilities as compared to our most wealthy. This is an issue that should 
be considered very carefully, however, and those interested in making their 
state tax systems more progressive should be especially aware of the impacts of 
the Act if it means offsetting the additional revenue with income-tax cuts. 
Ultimately, however, it seems most likely that the arguments for use-tax 
enforcement are strong enough to counsel action. A morally questionable and 
procedurally unjust system should not stand in order to make incremental gains 
with respect to the distribution of the tax burden. That issue should be 
addressed in a more direct, comprehensive fashion. 
The discussion thus far has addressed the concerns that politicians or 
policy makers might have about enforcing use taxes, but what about our 
taxpayers? If taxpayers resist the enforcement of the tax, politicians would 
seem to risk their careers if they supported that action. This concern may be 
legitimate, but it appears to be overstated given the fact that many Republican 
governors have already publicly supported the Act.
184
 It seems as though those 
 
 179  2013 Wisconsin Act 20, Assemb. B. 40, 2013 Leg., Reg Sess. § 1460d (Wis. 2013). 
 180  See OHIO REV. CODE § 5741.03 (2014). 
 181  See UTAH CODE §§ 59-12-103.1 to .2 (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-18-18 (2014). 
 182  See, e.g., H.B. 593, 62d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2014); H.B. 2730, 2014 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Kan. 2014); H.B.4973, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2013); H.B. 1424, 108th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2014); S.B. 6571, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2014). 
 183  See INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, WHO PAYS? A DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
TAX SYSTEMS IN ALL 50 STATES 6 (2015), http://www.itep.org/pdf/whopaysreport.pdf. The ITEP 
report is not without its critics. See Liz Malm et al., Comments on Who Pays? A Distributional 
Analysis of the Tax Systems in All 50 States (Second Edition), TAX FOUND. (Jan. 16, 2015), 
http://taxfoundation.org/article/comments-who-pays-distributional-analysis-tax-systems-all-50-
states-second-edition (critiquing several elements of the ITEP study, but not contesting basic 
conclusions regarding the regressivity and progressivity of particular state taxes). 
 184  Bernie Becker & Kevin Bogardus, GOP Governors Bolster Online Sales Tax Push, THE 
HILL (June 6, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/231899-gop-governors-bolster-
sales-tax-push. Of course, one should not ignore the differences between governors supporting 
Congress taking action that would lead to taxpayers paying the use tax and their own 
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politicians have obtained an adequate comfort level with use-tax collection 
given its broad impact on their state government’s finances. 
A final benefit of use-tax enforcement is that it might actually increase 
taxpayer support for a federal solution like the Act. If taxpayers were faced 
with the administrative hassles of determining and paying their own tax, they 
might soon favor collection of the tax at the point of sale. Consumer sentiment 
regarding the Act might change, and Internet vendors may find that tax 
collection is a valuable customer service.
185
 Enforcement may thus provide the 
path to where states would prefer to be in any event. 
Ultimately, obtaining taxpayer support or at least relative indifference 
to use-tax enforcement likely rests in taking the very actions that will be 
required to obtain voluntary compliance as well. Taxpayers must be educated 
about the tax, the purpose for the tax, and the benefits that the state will see 
from enforcement.
186
 Governors that wish to use the revenue to offset other 
taxes can also use the tax cut as the “lead” with taxpayers. Some may also wish 
to specifically direct the funds collected to projects with broad taxpayer 
support.
187
 In the end, given the relatively small impact of use-tax enforcement 
on each individual consumer and the potential benefits from collecting that tax, 
fear of political backlash should not prevent state action on this issue.
188
 
C. The Economics of Nonenforcement 
Having addressed the concerns about the economic and political costs 
of enforcement, it is worth considering the other side of the picture. Could there 
be benefits, separate from administrative cost savings, from not enforcing the 
use tax? Professors Leandra Lederman and Ted Sichelman have recently 
theorized that selective, measured nonenforcement could be utilized as a 
method of effectively changing the substance of tax law to increase social 
welfare.
189
 This could occur either when taxation prevents transactions with a 
positive social welfare
190
 or when the elasticity of demand for a product or 
 
administration taking that action. Governors get political cover with the former, but may be 
unwilling to risk the latter. 
 185  The Author’s own experience supports this view. Shopping on websites that collect the tax 
makes use-tax filing much simpler, and commerce with such vendors is preferred in his 
household for that reason. 
 186  See Thimmesch, supra note 67 (manuscript at 35–38) (discussing the information-
provision aspect of state enforcement efforts). 
 187  Of course, money is fungible, so this is largely a matter of marketing. 
 188  This statement is made as a normative matter, not as a prediction of what political action 
will be taken. 
 189  Leandra Lederman & Ted Sichelman, Enforcement as Substance in Tax Compliance, 70 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1679 (2013). 
 190  Social welfare for purposes of this model includes consumer surplus and producer surplus. 
The authors adopted simplifying assumptions that the tax system imposes no costs and that tax 
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activity subject to the tax is high, but the purchase of the product or 
engagement in the activity has positive externalities.
191
 For example, it might 
be that joining (and using) a gym has positive externalities, but that the demand 
for gyms is highly elastic. In contrast, it might be that joining a cigar club has 
negative externalities, but that demand for that product is highly inelastic. A 
broad sales tax that applies to both would have the result of reducing demand 
for gyms, and thus reducing the positive externalities associated with exercise 
activities, while impacting cigar club membership purchases very little. In that 
situation, enforcement of the sales tax against the gyms may produce a 
suboptimal result compared to dedicating enforcement of the tax to the cigar 
clubs. 
Could this type of analysis be used to suggest that the current 
nonenforcement of use taxes is actually an optimal policy decision from the 
standpoint of increasing social welfare or maximizing positive externalities? To 
begin with, the former is highly unlikely. The construct built by Lederman and 
Sichelman applies to situations with very particular sets of facts and is centered 
on the taxation of particular products. As they recognize, the taxing agency that 
applies this type of analysis would need to evaluate “the relevant demand 
curves, supply curves, and the seller’s production and opportunity costs.”192 
This strategy also relies on taxpayers that are informed of the taxing agency’s 
audit and penalty rates.
193
 It thus requires taxpayers to read, understand, and 
apply “detailed information.”194 Lederman and Sichelman note that their model 
“may only be suitable for only the most sophisticated taxpayers.”195 
These conditions are not met when evaluating the large-scale 
nonenforcement of use taxes. As a primary matter, the transactions covered by 
the use tax are incredibly varied and likely include every product that can be 
sold. Complete nonenforcement ignores the individual supply and demand 
curves for products and sellers’ production and opportunity costs for those 
products. Nonenforcement of use taxes is not measured nonenforcement, but 
blunt nonenforcement.
196
 
 
revenues provide no greater utility than if those funds remained with producers. Id. at 1712, 1717 
n.171. 
 191  Id. at 1706–24. 
 192  Id. at 1726. 
 193  Id. at 1728. 
 194  Id. 
 195  Id. 
 196  To be sure, states could perhaps use targeted use-tax nonenforcement to increase social 
welfare with respect to certain types of transactions. This, however, would be based on the types 
of products being purchased and not their method of purchase. Further, even assuming that states 
could establish that use taxes generally result in inefficiencies that exceed the social benefits 
from taxation, it is unclear that measured nonenforcement (rather than complete nonenforcement) 
would be advisable. As noted, that approach requires that the targeted taxpayers are sophisticated 
persons who make cost-benefit analyses with respect to their tax decisions. They must 
incorporate the likelihood of audit and their penalty potential when making tax-reporting 
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The measured enforcement model might have more applicability when 
looking at the externality rationale. Recall that Lederman and Sichelman 
posited that selective enforcement might be justified in order to promote the 
consumption of goods with positive externalities and to discourage the 
consumption of goods with negative externalities.
197
 Although use-tax 
nonenforcement applies too broadly to affect the consumption of particular 
goods, one could conceivably argue that it might encourage the positive 
externalities that come from promoting Internet commerce and the use of the 
Internet, more broadly. Certainly, there have been immense positive social 
impacts from the emergence of the Internet and its development as a significant 
forum for commercial transactions. In that way, one could argue that providing 
an enforcement “safe harbor” for Internet transactions is economically justified 
and that states should not seek to enforce their use taxes for that reason. This 
protectionist philosophy is reflected in Congress’s passage of the Internet Tax 
Freedom Act, which has prohibited states from imposing taxes directly on 
Internet access, and from imposing discriminatory or multiple taxes on 
electronic commerce, since 1998.
198
 Congress has felt that protecting the 
Internet from that type of taxation would serve the goal of supporting a 
valuable tool for public good. 
The biggest problem with justifying use-tax nonenforcement as a way 
of tapping into the positive externalities of the Internet is again one of fit. If we 
wanted to increase those externalities, we would expect states to simply exempt 
all Internet sales from consumption taxes. In reality, though, states “exempt” 
only a portion of Internet commerce from taxation, and that is only because the 
Supreme Court’s physical-presence rule requires them to do so. Having 
rejected that rationale, then, it seems like an untenable position to argue against 
use-tax enforcement simply to maintain those externalities in more limited 
form.
199
 
Finally, use-tax nonenforcement extends well beyond Internet 
purchases. As noted throughout this Article, use taxes may also be owed on 
catalogue purchases and purchases made while physically present in a remote 
 
decisions. Best success would therefore be with our “most sophisticated taxpayers.” Id. at 1728. 
This construct does not hold when talking about broad-based consumption taxes. Consumers, as 
a whole, are unlikely to digest and incorporate detailed information about audit rates and 
penalties with respect to the great number of products that they purchase during the year. See id. 
(noting the difficulties presented when a single tax return reports “many classes of transactions). 
Measured enforcement policies with respect to use taxes are thus likely to be difficult to 
construct to achieve their purposes. 
 197  See id. at 1719–23. 
 198  Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998). 
 199  We can further question whether a subsidy in the form of use-tax nonenforcement is really 
of significant benefit. The Internet is firmly entrenched in modern American life, and its use is 
certainly not limited to those situations in which a consumer makes a purchase from a remote 
vendor. 
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state. If we were to accept use-tax nonenforcement as a subsidy for the Internet, 
we would expect to see enforcement of the tax in other situations. 
This analysis ultimately shows that the model of measured enforcement 
is unlikely to provide a justifiable reason for failing to enforce use taxes as a 
matter of economic, rather than political, theory. Even if Internet sales would 
optimally escape state consumption taxes, the method in which states are 
currently failing to enforce those taxes does not comport with that goal. To be 
sure, the use of second-best solutions is often warranted, but this situation does 
not appear to be a compelling one in which to apply that construct. 
V. SALVAGING THE VALIDITY OF THE USE TAX 
This Article has thus far outlined the problems with states’ current 
vendor-centric approaches to the state use tax and has advocated for the 
adoption of a consumer-centric approach instead. That approach involves more 
than simply attempting enforcement actions against taxpayers, and this Part 
thus outlines the many facets involved and provides specific policy proposals 
for states to consider. These include enforcement strategies, but also include 
substantive reforms to the tax and modifications to how use-tax noncompliance 
is penalized. 
A. Enforcement Action 
The consumer-centric model for use-tax enforcement starts first and 
foremost with states taking meaningful efforts to enforce the tax.
200
 Those 
enforcement efforts should include both coercive enforcement action in the 
form of audits and litigation, but also educational efforts to ensure that use-tax 
laws, and punishments for their violation, are known. As discussed above, this 
is not only a matter of economic imperative but of moral imperative. If the 
government does not seek to punish those who do not comply with the tax, it 
has no right to require our Washingtons to pay the tax or to label them as 
fraudsters or perjurers for failing to do so. 
Of course, enforcement action need not necessarily mean a widespread 
use-tax audit program. States could adopt many small measures to induce 
compliance. This could include auditing taxpayers’ use-tax payments as a part 
of any income-tax audit or sending taxpayers inquiry letters if they report a 
suspiciously low, or no, amount of use tax due. States could also use targeted 
compliance efforts. Professor Leigh Osofsky, for example, has written on the 
potential benefits of micro-deterrence strategies, and states could experiment 
 
 200  This Article’s discussion of state enforcement efforts is necessarily brief. The methods in 
which states can enforce their use taxes implicate concerns in a number of areas discussed in the 
tax-compliance literature. I have set out a full strategy for use-tax enforcement in a 
contemporaneous Article. See generally Thimmesch, supra note 67 (manuscript at 34–49). 
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with those approaches in lieu of broad campaigns.
201
 Regardless of the 
approach, states must take meaningful action to enforce their use taxes. 
B. Substantive Reform to the Use Tax 
State efforts to enforce use taxes will only increase the need for states 
to reform those taxes to make compliance possible. Without those reforms, 
enforcement action may serve only to further undermine the morality and 
unfairness of the tax. Luckily, reform is possible. 
The difficulties that taxpayers have complying with use taxes stem 
from the fact that the use tax is structured as a full complement to the state sales 
tax. That leads to practical difficulties that prevent taxpayer compliance.
202
 
Consumers simply cannot reasonably track the required data across an entire 
year, or many years, without unwarranted cost. Full compliance with the tax is 
thus virtually impossible. There are only two options for salvaging the validity 
of the tax in this respect—the tax must be scrapped altogether or it must be 
reformed so that compliance is possible. The former is neither feasible nor 
advisable. The tax plays an important role in state public finance and is 
necessary to maintain the efficacy of the state sales tax.
203
 To save the 
legitimacy and morality of the tax, then, states must modify the tax to allow 
consumers to comply. This likely means exempting certain purchases from the 
tax or allowing consumers to rely completely on tables issued by the state. 
Either will require states to accept a tax that does not fully complement the 
state sales tax. 
1. Necessary Use-Tax Exemptions 
As discussed above, complying with the use tax is most difficult with 
respect to purchases made while the taxpayer is physically present in 
jurisdictions with no or low sales tax rates.
204
 One way to “fix” the use tax 
 
 201  See Osofsky, supra note 112. The micro-deterrence approach recognizes that enforcement 
resources are limited and challenges the idea that those resources should be dedicated to the 
“worst” offenders first. Id. at 368–77 (making the case for concentrated enforcement specifically 
within the cash business tax sector). Instead, targeted, rotating enforcement can increase 
compliance by making subpopulations compliant and generating norms of compliance from a 
micro-level. Id. at 354–57. States considering such an approach would, of course, need to be 
concerned with ensuring that its efforts do not violate taxpayers’ notions of procedural justice. 
 202  See supra Part III.C.2 (discussing the difficulties with complying with state use taxes). 
 203  This is true despite consumers’ massive noncompliance. First, the tax is collected in a 
number of situations other than those causing the estimated $20 billion use-tax gap. See supra 
notes 51–67 and accompanying text (discussing a variety of ways in which the use tax is 
currently collected). Additionally, the very existence of the tax prevents further shifts to out-of-
state purchasing in those areas. 
 204  See supra Part II.B. (showing that “low” sales tax rates, for this purpose, means rates that 
are lower than the rate of tax that will apply in the jurisdiction of the purchaser’s use). 
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would thus be for states to provide exemptions from the use tax in one or both 
of those situations. The more limited approach would be for states to provide a 
use-tax exemption as long as some amount of local sales tax was paid on the 
purchase of the item. (This would address the plight of our poor Horned Frogs 
fan discussed above.)
205
 That exemption would eliminate the need for 
consumers to track the amount of tax that they pay on all out-of-state purchases 
and to calculate and pay tax on any differential between that amount and the 
amount of sales tax that would have been owed if the purchase were made in 
the state of use. This approach would thus assist greatly in ensuring that 
consumers stood a reasonable chance of complying with state use taxes. 
Only exempting purchases made in low-tax states would, however, still 
leave taxpayers responsible for tracking their purchases made while physically 
in no-tax states. That different result may be conceptually justifiable—it is 
certainly easier for a taxpayer to know the use tax that she owes when she paid 
no sales tax on a purchase than when she paid some amount of tax and must 
recall that amount. This does not mean that compliance in that situation is 
simple though, especially when a state does not have a first-use doctrine.
206
 
Consumers would still be required to track their annual activity and to 
determine the taxability of many transactions over the course of a year or 
longer. Taxpayers who live near no-tax states would face an especially high 
burden. Those individuals may frequently travel to those states, and may 
consequently be required to track a significant amount of out-of-state 
purchases. Compliance would thus remain virtually impossible even if states 
exempted purchases on which some amount of sales tax was paid. To fully 
ensure that individuals are able to comply with use taxes, then, an exemption 
for all purchases made by a consumer while physically out of their home state 
appears to be proper. 
One immediate concern that states may have with a full exemption of 
the sort just proposed is that it could certainly cause consumers to go to their 
neighboring low-tax states to make purchases. The exemption would thus 
distort consumer behavior by explicitly giving a preference to that 
consumption. This would certainly not be favored by local merchants and 
would raise equity concerns for taxpayers not fortunate enough to live near the 
border with such a state. These concerns are legitimate, but that situation would 
bear little difference from the current state of affairs. Purchasers wishing to 
avoid state sales tax can already travel to neighboring states to make their 
purchases, and they are not currently paying the required use tax.
207
 Providing 
an explicit exemption for those purchases would thus have no real effect on 
their behavior and would result in only paper losses. The only individuals 
 
 205  See supra text accompanying notes 43–46. 
 206  See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
 207  Research supports the conclusion that current policies do indeed have an impact on 
consumer shopping behavior. See THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
FINANCE 416 (Robert D. Ebel & John E. Petersen eds., 2012). 
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impacted by this exemption would appear to be our Washingtons. Given the 
opportunity to avoid tax legally, they may do so. What we know for certain, 
though, is that all of our Washingtons would benefit from not having to worry 
that their inability to track their liabilities might lead to significant legal 
offenses. That would be a favorable result. 
2. Limitations on Use-Tax Exemptions 
Notwithstanding the desirability of the broad-based exemptions 
proposed above, some limits would be advisable. First, there should be a dollar 
limit on the applicability of the exemption, on a per-transaction basis. The 
exemption should not apply to any purchase above $100 or $500, for 
example.
208
 Recall that the reason for the proposed use-tax exemption is that 
tracking small purchases is too difficult from an administrative perspective. A 
consumer who travels across state lines and makes a significant purchase is not 
in that position. Those types of transactions are much easier to track and recall 
for tax-reporting purposes. They are also of a type where traveling out of state 
solely to avoid tax is more likely. For example, a purchaser is much more likely 
to travel across state lines to save sales tax on furniture or an airplane than on 
coffee pods. Consumer education on the issue would also be relatively easy. 
Setting a bright-line threshold creates a clear rule that is easily understood.
209
 
States that would be uncomfortable allowing taxpayers to purposefully 
avoid tax by making a purchase out of state may be tempted to consider 
adopting a catch-all provision that denies the exemption to any purchase made 
with the specific intent of avoiding the use tax. That type of provision would 
match the purpose of providing the use-tax exemption (i.e., protecting 
taxpayers from unknown or unknowable liabilities) while not protecting those 
who purposefully structure their affairs to avoid taxation. The latter group can 
hardly be said to fall within our group for whom compliance is impossible. A 
purchase made with the intent to evade tax is a known purchase that can be 
tracked and on which tax can be paid. For this reason, such a limitation may 
make imminent sense. 
Unfortunately, there are three practical difficulties with such an 
approach. First, states would have to determine what role a taxpayer’s intent to 
avoid tax would have to play in the purchase. Need it be the sole reason for a 
purchase or merely a contributing factor? Clearly, taxpayers who purposefully 
travel to another state to purchase an item without paying sales tax are not 
 
 208  The precise amount would be an administrative decision taking into account the state’s 
revenue needs, administrative costs, and impressions regarding consumer responsiveness to tax 
“breaks.” 
 209  Of course, the bright-line rule would cause price distortion at the margins. With a $500 
threshold amount, one could assume that retailers selling goods in a low-tax state with a high-tax 
neighbor would gravitate toward $499 prices for goods in that value range. This type of 
gamesmanship would be expected at any price point, but should be considered by states when 
setting their threshold amounts. 
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unfairly subject to state use tax. However, what about a taxpayer who decides 
to purchase a coat partially because her location of travel is a bit cold and 
partially because she can pay a relatively low sales tax? Would that purchase be 
subject to use tax under an intent-based standard? 
The second difficulty with this approach is how it would be 
administered. How could a state determine the particular intent associated with 
a purchase? Outside of the most egregious of cases, or those where there is a 
paper trail for some reason, states will be unable to determine why a purchaser 
made a particular purchase. Again, the tax would only fall on the most honest. 
Finally, an intent-based approach would also raise concerns about the 
possibility of compliance with the law under the view of morality introduced 
above.
210
 If a taxpayer cannot know when her intent was “enough,” she cannot 
be sure that she can comply with the law, and the legitimacy of that law can be 
called into question. This approach should not be taken unless necessary. 
These concerns are worthy and call into question the advisability of an 
intent-based system. Fortunately, though, states’ concerns leading to such a 
system would likely be reduced in importance by the use of a dollar limitation 
on the exemption. It is much more likely that a taxpayer will purposefully 
structure a purchase to occur out-of-state when an asset of significant value is 
involved. States should thus focus on adopting specific exemptions with de 
maximus limitations. 
3. Tax Tables 
Another way for states to make use-tax compliance possible would be 
for them to stop requiring taxpayers to track their purchases altogether. A 
number of states currently allow taxpayers to report use tax by relying on tables 
published by the state.
211
 Those tables provide taxpayers with an amount of tax 
that they are able to report in lieu of determining the actual amount of tax that 
they owe based on their purchase history. This approach is perhaps the most 
favorable from an administrative standpoint. It provides taxpayers with clear 
relief from determining their liabilities and assures the taxing authority that 
taxpayers reporting that amount have met their obligations. Of course, to 
provide those benefits, a taxpayer’s use of the table must firmly establish her 
use-tax liability, but many states that provide tables currently do not follow that 
approach. They instead retain the ability to audit and adjust the taxpayer’s 
reported liability.
212
 This practice undermines the benefits of the table approach 
from the moral perspective introduced above and is not ideal. A taxpayer’s use 
of a table should be conclusive as to her liability. 
 
 210  See supra Part III.C.2. 
 211  See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 212  See supra note 26. 
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This approach provides administrative benefits for states and taxpayers, 
but some taxpayers might object to this approach as simply rewriting the 
substantive law to require a set amount of tax to be paid. A taxpayer who 
reports any amount less than the amount shown on the table would be inviting 
an audit, and it would be difficult for such a taxpayer to prove that her 
liabilities were indeed so low. This could have negative consequences for those 
with below-average liabilities under current law. Without other reforms to the 
use-tax system, those taxpayers would effectively have the choice of relying on 
the table and paying more tax than is owed or attempting to comply by keeping 
and assembling an incredible amount of information about their annual 
purchase activity. Reliance on tables, alone, may therefore be a disfavored 
choice for the psychological reasons discussed above—it may not appear to be 
a fair option. 
The benefits of this approach, however, likely make it worth 
considering. The clarity of that approach along with its reduction of the costs 
imposed on taxpayers (in terms of compliance costs) makes this very attractive. 
Further, data show that more taxpayers report use tax in states with lookup 
tables than in states without lookup tables.
213
 Finally, any unfairness to those 
with below-average liabilities under current law is offset (at least partially) by 
the additional fairness achieved by implementing a system with which 
compliance is possible. 
4. Other Options 
Before concluding this Section, it is important to discuss two other 
potential reforms that may seem to address the problems addressed herein. 
First, states could simply provide a de minimis exemption to their use taxes. 
Such an exception would eliminate the requirement that consumers track every 
single transaction with accountant-like precision and would seemingly allow 
taxpayers to report their liabilities without worrying that they have missed 
some trivial transaction. This would be similar to the approach taken by 
Minnesota, which provides an exception from the use tax for the first $770 of 
purchases in a year.
214
 
While a de minimis exception may seem to provide relief at first blush, 
it fails upon further inspection. At a very basic level, the only way for a 
taxpayer to know whether such an exception applies is to track her purchases. 
Blind reliance on a de minimis threshold is no more comforting for our 
Washingtons than the current system. A de minimis exception merely moves 
the ball; it does not eliminate it. 
 
 213  Manzi, supra note 4, at 8–10. Although the participation rate is higher in those states, the 
average amounts of use tax reported on returns in those states was actually lower. Id. at 10–11. 
This suggests that the provision of a table could bring more taxpayers into a reporting posture, 
but that other efforts should be used to increase their individual compliance rate. 
 214  MINN. STAT. § 297A.67, subd. 21(2) (2015). 
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The second additional reform option is on much firmer ground. All 
states should at least adopt statutes or administrative rules that relieve 
consumers from use-tax liabilities if they have a meaningful use of the property 
first in another state. This type of exception would address many of the 
difficulties inherent in trying to comply with state use taxes. At a minimum, it 
would limit taxpayers’ recordkeeping requirements. This type of exception 
would certainly act to disalign state sales and use taxes, but it would not result 
in any meaningful lost revenue and it would remove an impediment to respect 
for the use-tax system.
215
 
C. Decriminalizing Use-Tax Noncompliance 
As an alternative or complement to the suggestions above, states could 
address the morality and equity issues currently present in our use-tax system 
by simply ratcheting down the classification of use-tax noncompliance. 
Taxpayers who file a tax return knowingly reporting use tax incorrectly are 
often committing fraud and/or perjury, which are often felonies. That fact alone 
is problematic. We cannot have an unenforced tax that turns Washingtons into 
criminals. A state not intending to reform or enforce their taxes should, at the 
very least, modify how use-tax noncompliance is penalized. If states are going 
to treat use-tax noncompliance like speeding, noncompliance should carry the 
same consequences. It should technically be a minor violation carrying with it 
the same stigma and social cost. This should again, however, be measured with 
respect to the attitude of our Washingtons. They may not represent the norm, 
but they represent the ideal. States that can affirmatively reduce the severity of 
the use-tax offense would go a long way toward addressing the moral and 
psychological problems with the current use-tax regime. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Use-tax noncompliance is rampant, and that situation is generally 
viewed with helplessness. Obtaining compliance at the individual level seems 
like a fool’s errand while vendor-centric approaches appear to show promise. 
States have thus focused their energies on the latter by adopting expansive 
nexus rules and by lobbying for congressional intervention to extend their 
power. This Article establishes, however, that this generally accepted approach 
cannot stand. The nonenforcement of state use taxes raises significant 
economic, moral, and psychological concerns. From an economic perspective, 
the most probable form of federal intervention would likely close less than one- 
 
 215  Of course, some intent carve-out could be applied so that taxpayers with very significant 
purchases could not simply use their property in a low or no tax state for a year and then move it 
to its final resting place. This practice is used with respect to high-value art, for example. See 
Graham Bowley & Patricia Cohen, Buyers Find Tax Break on Art: Let It Hang Awhile in 
Oregon, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2014, at A1. 
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half of the use-tax gap. From a moral perspective, states’ nonenforcement 
postures are inconsistent with generally accepted notions regarding the proper 
exercise of government power. From a psychological perspective, those 
postures also likely undermine taxpayers’ motivations to comply with their 
existing tax obligations. 
Those problems can only be solved, and must be solved, by adopting a 
consumer-centric approach to the use tax. That approach will require states to 
reform their use taxes such that compliance will be possible and to enforce 
those taxes against those who do not comply. This proposal certainly goes 
against modern thought on how to best address the use-tax gap, but it is the 
only way to salvage the validity of the use tax and to save it from being the tax 
on honesty that it currently represents. 
 
